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 Foreword
�
The ability of British Prime Ministers to rearrange Whitehall departments serves as a powerful 
tool to meet existing and emerging policy challenges and one we think should be preserved. 
Politically, the configuration of departments provides the framework for Cabinet membership 
and allows a Prime Minister to put a stamp on the building blocks of Whitehall, as well as 
signal priorities to the electorate. Indeed, it is such an important tool that only one new Prime 
Minister since 1950 has chosen not to reconfigure departments in some way after assuming 
the leadership. 
Machinery of government change, however, can be a very blunt instrument. We researched 
department reconfigurations from 1979 to 2009 and found that whilst they may bring 
advantages, the majority of changes were insufficiently planned, announced at very short 
notice and always involved costs. 
This report aims to provide some insight into department changes of the past 30 years and we 
present some in-depth case studies of changes which were deemed to be especially successful 
by our interviewees. The recommendations we propose do not limit the Prime Minister’s 
ability to make well-prepared changes to the structure of Whitehall. Instead, our research 
seeks to help Whitehall minimise the costs of reconfigurations so when Prime Ministers do 
decide to build and dismantle Whitehall departments, they do so using a more considered and 
planned approach. 
I hope we have been able to provide some insight into the changes which Whitehall has 
experienced in the past 30 years and that we stimulate some debate over how changes could 
be more effectively managed in future. The overarching objective of the Institute is to inspire 
the best in government through considered analysis, learning and debate. I hope you find this 
report a worthy contribution to that mission. 
Lord Bichard 
Executive Director, Institute for Government 
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 Executive summary
�
To change the shape of Whitehall – and by extension to alter the trajectory of 
ministerial careers – at the stroke of a pen is one of the most powerful tools 
at the disposal of the British Prime Minister. 
At their best, these machinery of government changes provide a way to adapt government 
departments to meet long-term policy and administrative goals. Our research shows that 
the most effective reorganisations over the past 30 years have had these kinds of goals at 
their heart. But however successful a new department might become, long term governance 
arrangements are seldom the primary motivation for machinery of government changes. 
Reconfigurations always provide the opportunity to reorder the Cabinet, reward allies and signal 
new priorities to the electorate. 
These potential benefits come at a price: whatever their motivation, machinery of government 
changes are often announced at very short notice, usually poorly managed and always costly. 
Where a wholly new department such as the Department for the Environment and Climate Change 
(DECC) is created, our research shows costs of at least £15m are incurred in the first year just to 
cover the extra staff and building expenditures required to support a new team of ministers. 
Productivity losses and pay settlements can increase this figure substantially. We estimate 
the cost of creating the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to be 
over £30m, and the price of creating the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) at almost 
£175m. In some cases, new departments are created only to be abolished within a short period, 
such as the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS). 
The current procedures for reorganising Whitehall departments do little to minimise these 
costs. The common themes that emerged from our 34 interviews with a wide range of senior 
and former officials included: 
No time to plan: new departmental structures are often announced by the Prime Minister 
with little or no prior planning. The transition teams tasked with reorganising or creating 
entirely new departments were often forced to ‘go live’ with insufficient planning time 
and with little or no resources in terms of staffing, buildings or equipment. In many cases, 
departments were created over a weekend, and in the exceptional case of DECC the team 
was given only one night to prepare. 
Lack of funding: new departments are allocated insufficient budgets to cover the set-up 
of corporate overhead functions. This is partly because the Treasury insists, somewhat 
unrealistically, that all changes are cost neutral. 
Overloaded staff: once departments are live, top officials and transition teams find 
themselves with a double workload, running day-to-day operations while also undertaking 
the strategic planning needed for new or reorganised departments. 
Little central support: the Cabinet Office and Treasury do not have the resources to 

provide effective support to new departments.
�
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 Shaking up Whitehall 
Despite these drawbacks, our report does not argue against the use of machinery of 
government changes per se. Whitehall departments may need periodic shaking up, if only to 
force new issues onto the administrative agenda and to tackle underperformance. 
While the current insistence on doing machinery of government changes quickly and in secret 
makes it nigh on impossible to manage them well, there are examples of departments, such as 
DWP and DECC, that make a great deal of administrative sense. Our case studies demonstrate 
that success is possible when changes are well planned and properly implemented, where a strong 
rationale for the changes can be made, and where staff can be positively engaged in making them 
happen. But important questions need to be considered before making any changes: 
Figure 1: Questions to ask before reconfiguring departments 
Questions to ask before reconfiguring departments Our analysis shows that: 
1.  Have we considered the alternatives to 
machinery of government change? 
Administrative savings and greater policy 
coordination can often be achieved without 
reconfiguring departments. 
2.  Are we prepared to spend at least £15m on 
this? 
Restructuring costs are at least £15m. 
3.  Are there big pay differences between staff 
in the affected departments? If so, are we 
prepared to level up salaries or risk industrial 
action? 
Levelling-up differential pay can be a massive 
cost, exceeding £170m in one case. 
4. Can we afford a productivity dip and to wait 
for at least two years before realising concrete 
benefits of this reorganisation? 
It takes at least two years for the new 
organisation to settle and three or more years to 
start realising expected benefits. 
5. Is this reorganisation really just about the 
politics of cabinet formation? 
Changes undertaken for purely political reasons 
are the least likely to deliver real benefits. 
Where department reconfigurations are deemed necessary and desirable, we find that a 
number of small but important changes would enable politicians and officials to strike a better 
balance between the political imperative to change departmental structures and the managerial 
imperative of good administration: 
1. Changes should be announced early enough to allow effective planning for  
the transition 
Departmental reorganisations should be unlinked from the immediate context of ministerial 
reshuffle announcements. Departments should not be created until at least four weeks after 
they are announced, giving time for initial preparation and set-up. Any large-scale changes 
should not be implemented until after an affirmative parliamentary resolution (point 2 
below). The current conventions of maintaining extreme secrecy about prospective changes 
of department structures should be abandoned. 
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 2. An affirmative parliamentary resolution should be required within six months 
of a reorganisation 
All departmental reconfigurations should require an affirmative parliamentary resolution 
when transfer of functions orders are laid and before substantial reorganisation work 
begins. Parliament should have an opportunity to consider departmental changes in a 
detailed way before a vote is held, possibly in the Liaison Committee of Select Committee 
chairs in the House of Commons, or possibly in a joint meeting of relevant departmental 
select committees. The Cabinet Secretary and permanent secretaries involved should 
attend to outline how it is intended that planned reorganisations will work. A detailed 
cost-benefit analysis of the changes made and a properly developed business plan should 
be considered in advance of the main parliamentary debate by the relevant departmental 
select committee, assisted by staff from the National Audit Office. The Treasury must be 
more realistic in recognising that new and heavily reorganised departments will necessarily 
incur extra costs for at least their first year and that this needs to be factored into 
reorganisation planning. 
3. New and radically changed departments should receive more support from  
the centre 
The Cabinet Office and Treasury need to improve their procedures and capabilities to 
provide more positive support for new or heavily reorganised departments. The Cabinet 
Office should create a capacity to provide a ‘scratch team’ to run a new department’s 
core responsiveness operations for a transition period of at least six weeks, helping set-
up press operations, interim human resources functions and facilitating IT and finance 
systems changes, while its senior officials are undertaking the reorganisation work. The 
Cabinet Office should recognise that the reorganisation of departments is a vital task that 
is likely to recur reasonably frequently, and should henceforth be properly documented and 
continuously improved over time – instead of the current situation where experience resets 
to zero in each new case. 
4. Post-change assessments 
The cost-benefit analysis, business plan and strategic change programme originally 
submitted to Parliament should provide a focus for the relevant departmental select 
committee to assess the benefits and costs of changes, assisted by staff from the National 
Audit Office, within 18 months to two years. By this time changes should have ‘bedded in’ 
and differential pay or productivity dip problems should be evident. 
Looking forward 
The changes we propose do not limit the Prime Minister’s ability to make well-prepared and 
properly considered changes to the structure of Whitehall in a timely way. However, they would 
improve the executive’s accountability to parliament and the public for changes made to the 
structure of government. Taken together, our recommendations would help minimise the costs 
of changes and enhance the likelihood of putting through organisational changes that are well-
considered, properly planned and implemented in a sustainable way, and which positively build 
the capacity of UK central government. In the wake of the recent general election, and with a 
looming period of relative austerity in the public sector, there is no better time to reconsider 
how machinery of government changes are undertaken. 
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 1. Changes in the United Kingdom 
and other countries 
One departmental reorganisation after another in short succession is increasingly seen as, at 
best, a ‘mixed blessing’ for the UK – a symptom of the ‘hyperactivism’ of the political class and 
of the country’s exceptional under-provision of constitutional safeguards. 
In this section, we consider whether the UK is in fact hyperactive in the pace of its 
reorganisations by examining: 
1.	�how political and administrative factors are involved in the decision to make a change of 
departments; 
2.	�the extent and pace of change in the UK, asking whether it has accelerated under New 
Labour compared with previous UK governments; 
3. whether the UK’s record of changing the centre of the machine is exceptional compared with 
other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Finally in this chapter we look at whether the process of change in the UK is exceptional in 
allowing Prime Ministers to change the structure of departments without much accountability. 
The politics and administration of changing departments 
The main Whitehall departments are critically important to how the UK state is organised. 
Their top ministers are secretaries of state with guaranteed seats in the Cabinet and its sub-
cabinets and committees. The main departments also organise and give top-level purpose and 
direction to the wider public sector, directly controlling an apparatus of executive agencies, 
non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) and main quasi-governmental agencies, plus a very 
few non-ministerial departments (of which the main example is Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC)). Beyond these executive bodies, the central state embraces regulatory, 
advisory and consultative organisations, again organised into departmental fiefdoms. Outside 
central government, many Whitehall departments have further extended groups of ‘client’ 
bodies or stakeholders, whose inputs they organise into government decision-making and 
whose activities they fund and link to targets. In all, there are at least 950 such arms-length 
bodies (ALBs) reporting to Whitehall and at least 11 distinct ‘types’ of ALB operating at different 
degrees of remove from Whitehall control.1 
Thus departments are the key bridge between the core executive of Cabinet, Prime Minister, 
Treasury and other core departments and committees on the one hand and the ‘front-line’, 
delivery-level public sector agencies on the other: local authorities, NHS bodies, police forces 
and so on. Devolution to Scotland, Wales, the Greater London Authority and Northern Ireland 
has nibbled important edges away from Whitehall’s domain. But the strength of the UK-wide 
functions and the predominant size of England in the union both mean that we remain one of 
the largest undivided government administrations in the western world. 
So how departments are structured and restructured matters a great deal, both at the top 
political level, in terms of the Prime Minister’s ability to get the best possible performance from 
her or his government and at the administrative level. 
10  1. Changes in the United Kingdom and other countries 
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In Whitehall speak, the reorganisation of the main departments is termed ‘machinery of 
government’ (commonly abbreviated to MoG) change. In some other liberal democratic 
countries (such as the US) changing national government departments is rarely undertaken and 
requires Herculean efforts at achieving consensus before reforms can be made. But in the UK 
the organisation of Whitehall basically stems from Crown prerogative powers – that is from the 
unremoved autocratic powers of the medieval British monarchy. Like almost all other Crown 
prerogatives (such as the ability to declare war or sign international treaties) the ability to 
re-sculpt Whitehall’s departmental structure is fundamentally exercised on the Crown’s behalf 
by government ministers, in this case specifically the Prime Minister, with some subsequent 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
Balancing three sets of influences 
In deciding whether to keep things as they are or on the need to make a change, and in 
choosing which particular change or combination of changes to make at any one time, 
the Prime Minister has to balance three main influences: external pressures, administrative 
challenges and political and cabinet-making considerations (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: How the Prime Minister decides on departmental reorganisations 
Point of 
decision 
Policy/administrative problem 1 
Policy problem 2 
Policy problem 3 
External change 1 
External change 2 
External change 3 
PM’s political imperative 1 
PM’s political imperative 2 
Departmental 
reorganisation 
outcome 
1.	�External change One fairly constant motor of changes at the departmental level (and in 
terms of the substructure of agencies and executive bodies) is the alteration of the external 
context, the growth of new demands and priorities for the UK state to grapple with. Some of 
these changes can be coped with in other ways than to expensively reorganise departments, 
especially by creating cabinet committees, pooling budget-lines or forming cross-cutting 
task forces or working groups across the existing departments. But where this first recourse 
has not fully worked, or the new priority or issue has begun to look more permanent or 
more serious, then the issue will arise of vesting it directly with a secretary of state and a 
department who can bring both the political priority and the administrative focus needed. 
 2. Administrative challenges	�A second set of influences on the Prime Minister’s thinking, and 
one that he or she will discuss in detail with the Cabinet Secretary who heads the home civil 
service, concerns the performance of existing departments and administrative arrangements. 
If a minister personally is the main source of problems, he or she can be moved in the annual 
cabinet reshuffle that takes place (usually in June). But if a problem is more long-standing, 
in the structure or set–up of the department itself, or in the split of connected issues or 
functions across different departments, then changing ministers will not solve the difficulty. 
At one time, these matters were known principally to Whitehall insiders and surfaced only 
episodically in Parliament, in reports from the National Audit Office (NAO) or in the writings 
of experienced Whitehall watchers. But over the years the relative performance of Whitehall 
units has become more open to public and media inspection, and it is now publicly charted 
in a rather coded way by the regular Cabinet Office ‘capability reviews’ of departments. 
Normally the PM and Cabinet Secretary will have a small number of problem areas to 
consider in existing arrangements, some of which may correlate closely with new issues or 
priorities, and some of which are purely intra-governmental in character. 
3. Political and cabinet-making considerations	�The final set of influences on the Prime 
Minister are political and cabinet-making considerations. The Prime Minister does not 
directly control much by way of an administrative apparatus. In order to get things done, 
he or she appoints secretaries of state and junior ministerial posts from the available pool 
of senior party colleagues. Changing the set up of Whitehall departments is necessarily and 
inevitably bound up with the premier deciding exactly who should sit around the cabinet 
table and with what resources and ministerial brief. It involves the PM balancing political 
priorities, and setting a balance of power between the wings of their party (or in future, 
perhaps between different parties in a governing coalition). And the PM must work with the 
ministerial materials that he or she has to hand in the senior echelons of their party, with 
the particular personalities and sets of talents and vulnerabilities amongst the people judged 
sufficiently credible and competent enough to hold down the secretary of state role. A good 
minister for issue Y may well perform badly if suddenly asked to tackle issue Z, their style or 
interests no longer closely matching with the subject matter or the particular demands of a 
different ministerial role. 
As a result any Prime Minister contemplating a reorganisation of the Whitehall machine 
must necessarily combine a bewildering set of considerations – main changes in the external 
governing context, internal administrative and policy reasons, and political and cabinet-making 
factors – into a single overall strategic judgment. At each point of decision the external and 
policy factors are likely to throw up at least four or five possible options for adjustments, some 
of which might be combined, but which cannot all be tackled at once. 
The Prime Minister must therefore pick and choose among a range of potentially viable 
alternative changes, deciding which ones can be accomplished in a given year and which 
must be left for a later date or addressed in other ways. At the same time, the PM’s picking 
and choosing will be intensely influenced by short-term factors, the need to ensure party and 
governmental unity and top performance, the need to appease disgruntled senior colleagues 
who might otherwise depart or cause trouble, the need to bring on younger talents in the 
ministerial cadre, and, above all, the need to signal to voters, the media and Parliament that the 
government is purposeful, addressing the key political issues effectively and responding agilely 
to new threats and opportunities affecting the UK. 
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 The role of the Cabinet Secretary 
The Prime Minister’s decision is likely to be heavily influenced by political and personal 
factors about cabinet colleagues that he or she has most immediately experienced, even if 
these factors are rather short-term compared to some of the longer-term issues involved in 
department reorganisations. The desire of a key minister to tackle a certain policy challenge 
or take on additional functions coupled with the Prime Minister’s need to govern and manage 
Cabinet may override disruption to departments if a change could solve the former problem. 
The key role of the Cabinet Secretary in advising the premier on these issues is to represent the 
administrative and longer-term interests of the Whitehall machine, to try and ensure that any 
rearrangement eventually chosen will work effectively and have a good chance of becoming a 
long-standing part of the architecture of Whitehall and contributing to the stability, durability 
and performance of the government machine. 
In suggesting solutions the Cabinet Secretary and his or her staff are generally more 
experienced than even the longest-standing premier. The Cabinet Secretary has access from 
the inside to a history of Whitehall folklore replete with stories of the same solutions already 
tried and not working, or of closely analogous solutions attempted and later scrapped. The 
implications of reorganisations can therefore be better weighed and their implications worked 
through for different elements of the government’s programme. 
Types of reorganisation 
The Cabinet Office can put on the table for the PM to consider many differently shaped 
types of reorganisation, including the following elements summarised in Figure 3. At any 
one reorganisation a complex range of interrelated moves may be made affecting several 
departments at the same time, so that many changes will combine elements of two or more 
of the changes below. 
 1. Changes in the United Kingdom and other countries  13 
 Figure 3: Types of reorganisation 
Type of MoG Change Description Example 
Mergers Department level merging of entities 
or significant functions into a new 
organisational entity 
Climate Change (DEfRA) merger 
with Energy (BERR) creates 
DECC 
Demergers Department level demerging of 
significant functions into their own 
entity 
fCO splits into DfID and fCO 
Start-ups Creating a wholly new ministry with 
new functional priorities requiring new 
corporate centres 
DIUS 
Major acquisitions/ 
transfers of functions 
Sub-department level mergers and 
demergers of functions 
NOMS (HO) transferred to MoJ 
Terminations Legal cessation of departments and 
transfer of remaining functions to 
other organisational entities 
MAff 
•	� Department mergers, bringing together previously separate ministries, as with the merging 
of the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise into a single tax-raising ministry, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). A hallmark of mergers is that the total number of 
departments falls by at least one – at least one existing identity ceases to exist. 
•	� Demergers, separating out into a new department a set of functions previously carried out 
as a sub-component of a broader department, as with the creation of the Department for 
International Development out of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1997. 
•	� Start-ups, creating a wholly new ministry, as with the ill-fated Department for Innovation, 
Universities and Skills in 2006, although (as in this case) the component elements of a start-
up will usually already exist elsewhere and thus require a combination of a merger from two 
or more other departments as well as the demands of a start-up. 
•	� Major acquisitions and transfers of functions are essentially the government equivalent 
of corporate takeovers and buy-outs. Two or more departments remain in being, but a 
substantial set of responsibilities are shifted across from one to another. The leading recent 
example is the creation of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in 2007 by re-allocating prisons and 
the probation service (supposedly integrated under the National Offender Management 
System, NOMs) from the failing Home Office to be run instead in harness with the existing 
responsibilities of the Department of Constitutional Affairs (DCA). Whereas the previous 
Home Office/DCA boundary ran between all ‘law and order’ activities on the one hand and 
the courts on the other, the new boundary line lay between activities leading up to arrest 
(on the Home Office side) and all subsequent courts and sentence-related activities (run by 
the Ministry of Justice). 
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 •	� Terminations are essentially decisions to close down a department and transfer its remaining 
activities to other departments; usually because one or more of its key functions has 
been reorganised and the remaining activities no longer have the critical mass to justify a 
secretary of state position with a seat at Cabinet. A clear case was the 1992 abolition of the 
Department of Energy, following the privatisation of the UK’s previously state-owned gas 
and electricity industries, and the asset sales of large government oil industry stakes in the 
North Sea and in BP2. Occasionally, political factors may prevent the complete abolition of a 
department title associated with one previously powerful minister, even though its role has 
largely disappeared, as in the last phase of John Prescott’s Office of Deputy Prime Minister 
(ODPM) from 2002 to 2007. 
How frequently and extensively is Whitehall reorganised? 
The pace of change in Whitehall is quite dynamic. Figure 4 shows a synoptic picture of 
Whitehall reorganisations that have taken place across the three decades from 1979 to 2009. 
The unbroken lines here show which departments of state have survived unchanged by 
mergers, demergers and other reconstitutions of their role in this period; the list is not large, 
comprising: 
•	� the Ministry of Defence, although it has been internally reorganised in major ways; 
•	� the Treasury, although it has accreted functions and its relationship vis a vis the new 
integrated tax agency, HMRC, changed significantly in 2005; 
•	� the Cabinet Office, although it has swelled and shrunk periodically as it has added non-core 
functions and then shed them again; 
•	� the Scottish and Welsh Offices, although their roles diminished hugely in favour of the 
devolved governments of Scotland and Wales from 1999 onwards. Indeed nowadays their 
Secretary of State roles may be combined with holding other departmental briefs. 
Every other department has been substantively reorganised, even those such as the Home 
Office which has managed to retain the same name across the entire period but lost a large 
part of its traditional role to the Ministry of Justice in 2007. 
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 Figure 4: Department changes in Whitehall from 1979 to 2009 
Privy Council Office 
Welsh Office 
Northern Ireland Office 
Defence 
Scottish Office 
Home Office 
Lord Chancellor’s DCA MoJ 
FCO 
Overseas Development  Dfid 
MAFF 
Defra 
Transport 
Environment 
DETR 
DTLR 
DfT
 ODPM  DCLG 
Cabinet Office 
Treasury 
Civil Service Dept  HMRC 
Health & Social Security 
DSS 
DWP 
Employment 
Education & Science 
DEE 
DfES 
DIUS 
DCSF 
Trade 
Industry 
Energy 
DoH 
DTI  BERR 
BIS 
National 
Heritage  DCMS 
DECC 
Prices & Consumer Protection 
1979  1981  1983  1988  1992  1995  1997  2001  2002  2003  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Figures from 1950-1979 derived from Davis, Weller, Craswell and Eggins (1999). 
Trends in the pace of reorganisation in the UK 
Have the trends for reorganisation speeded up or become more extensive in modern times, and 
if so for what reasons? In particular, is there evidence for the commonly held perception (since 
the days of Harold Wilson) that Labour premiers tinker around more with departments than 
Conservative ones? 
Figure 5 shows that for many decades the number of departments has actually remained 
surprisingly constant at around 20. So if tinkering has been going on, it is with a largely fixed 
number of departments and size of cabinet. The bottom bars in Figure 5 show the overall 
numbers of departments affected by major reorganisations in any year (which peaked in 1971 
under Heath) and the numbers of net new departments (which are sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative). 
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 There is a relative scarcity of departmental reorganisations from 1975 to 1996. Mrs Thatcher 
certainly believed that department reorganisations were largely unnecessary, but it is important 
to note that her government, and that of John Major, presided over unprecedented changes at 
the sub-department level – selling state-owned enterprises to the private sector and pushing 
through the ‘Next Steps’ agencification programme that affected 55% of the UK civil service 
from 1988 to 1995. 
Figure 5: Trends in MoG department changes since 1950
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Figures from 1950-1979 derived from Davis, Weller, Craswell and Eggins (1999). 
Arguably there is a fairly fixed capacity for overall public sector organisation to be changed 
in any given time period, and so the Conservatives’ focus on restructuring sub-departmental 
operations may largely account for much of the stasis in top-level Whitehall organisations in 
the 1980s and early ’90s. 
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 Labour expands and Conservatives consolidate 
Figure 6 shows machinery of government changes per prime ministerial term and confirms that 
post-war Labour governments have tended to be slightly more active in changing departments 
(Labour governments on average implementing changes that affected 13 departments versus 
8.6 for Conservative). Similarly, Tory governments have typically re-structured Whitehall in 
a way that has reduced the total number of departments (by on average a reduction of 1.4) 
while Labour governments have tended to increase them (by on average 1.2).3 This may give us 
a general idea of what to expect following general elections where a party holds a majority of 
the votes. 
Figure 6: Department reconfigurations, 1950-2009 
Number of departments affected Net change 
Brown 
Blair 
Major 
Thatcher 
Callaghan 
Wilson 2 
Heath 
Wilson 1 
Douglas­Home 
McMillan 
Eden 
Churchill 
Labour average 
Conservative average 
19 
11 1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
4 
3 
­1 
­1 
­2 
­2 
­2 
­5 
­3 
6 
9 
9 
1 
6 
14 
28 
7 
13 
13 
3 
8 
Labour 
Conservative 
Note that the averages calculated for Labour and Conservatives are averages for the political parties over this time period. They do not 
reflect premier tenures. Figures from 1950-1979 derived from Davis, Weller, Craswell and Eggins (1999). 
Looking in more detail, Figure 7 shows that department reconfigurations are most likely after 
leadership changes – whether these occur post-election or simply after a leadership change 
post-appointment, that is, when a new Prime Minister assumes the leadership due to the 
resignation of his or her predecessor. In all Prime Ministerial leadership changes since 1951, 
only John Major in 1990 left the department configurations untouched within his first months 
in office. Indeed, it was not until after the 1992 election that he changed the department 
machinery by creating the Department of National Heritage (now the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport) and abolishing the Department of Energy by merging it with the Department 
for Trade and Industry (DTI). 
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 Figure 7: Department reconfigurations post-appointment and post-election,  
1950-2009 
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respectively) abstained from reconfiguring departments. Figures from 1950-1979 derived from Davis, Weller, Craswell and Eggins (1999). 
Interestingly, at the start of the last period of minority government in 1974, the incoming 
minority government under Harold Wilson made six changes to department configurations 
within his six months tenure leading up to the second election of 1974.4 No further changes 
were made by Wilson in majority government after 1974 nor during the Lib-Lab Pact of  
1977-78.5 James Callaghan, as a new Prime Minister put his stamp on the government 
machinery in between these periods by creating the Department of Transport in 1976 which 
was the only change made while in office. 
Figure 8 separates changes made by premiers in their first two years in office and illustrates 
that Gordon Brown does seem to show a greater proclivity to change Whitehall departments 
around, paralleled only by Edward Heath’s record – at least in the first two years in office. 
However, Brown’s record may look more exceptional because he is new to power, and so has 
not yet had time to consolidate a governance structure that he can live with. Indeed, Heath, 
who commissioned the committee on The Reorganisation of Central Government in 1970, 
restructured the majority of departments within his first two years and subsequently left the 
departments quite stable. 
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 One of the reasons why departmental changes may seem particularly turbulent in recent 
times is that they form part of a wider picture of ministerial changeovers, where there has 
been something of an acceleration of the ‘churning’ of ministers through different positions in 
the last decade.6 Every new secretary of state may create significant changes to departmental 
policy, distancing themselves from previous political initiatives or adopting a different style and 
set of priorities. Even in a department with a completely stable configuration, the cumulative 
effect of rapid changes of leadership raises significant issues. For instance, in a lecture at LSE in 
May 2008, the then recently retired Sir Richard Mottram, noted: 
One of my old departments (the Department for Work and Pensions) is… 
an employment and financial services organisation of world scale. It can 
be argued whether its secretary of state is by private sector analogy its 
Executive or Non-Executive Chairman for management purposes. (Clearly 
for strategy and policy he has a strongly executive/deciding role). Either way, 
the DWP has had six Secretaries of State since 2002, some brought down by 
events, one who resigned for his own reasons, a number simply reshuffled. 
If DWP were a regulated financial institution, this scale of turnover would 
surely have attracted the regulator’s attention (Mottram, 2008). 
Subsequently the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions changed twice more by the time of 
writing, making eight top ministers in all across the eight years between 2002 and 2010. 
Figure 8: Change in first two years of term vs. change in rest of term (and total number) 
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 The evolution of department types in the UK 
Turning to the more administrative aspects of recent reorganisations, do changes show any 
consistent pattern or trend over time in how departments are structured? The 1918 Haldane 
report identified two alternative principles upon which the services of government could be 
organised: “by persons or classes to be dealt with, or by distribution according to the services to 
be performed”.7 Haldane’s work led him to believe that departments could not deliver as high a 
standard of specialised service when its work was at the same time limited to a particular class 
of persons, and he famously argued for a service-focused structure, with each ministry running 
a particular specialised function: 
The other method, and the one which we recommend for adaption, is 
that defining the field of activity in the case of each department according 
to the particular service which it renders to the community as a whole. 
Thus a Ministry of Education would be concerned predominantly with 
the provision of education wherever, and by whomsoever, needed. Such 
a Ministry would have to deal with persons in so far only as they were to 
be educated, and not with particular classes of persons defined on other 
principles.8 
According to the report, structuring departments along service lines would lead to a 
minimum amount of confusion and overlapping and any joint governance areas could be 
met by collaborative arrangements where necessary. Continuing with the same example, he 
explained that: 
The work of the Education Department, for example, may incidentally 
trench on the sphere of Health, as in the arrangements of school houses and 
care for the health of scholars. Such incidental overlapping is inevitable, 
and any difficulties to which it may give rise must in our opinion be met 
by systematic arrangements for the collaboration of departments jointly 
interested in particular spheres of work.9 
With the expansion of state intervention, however, both these alternative approaches implied 
a proliferation of ministries. From the late 1950s onwards there was a trend to consolidate 
smaller ministries, culminating in the Heath White Paper’s advocacy of larger ‘programme’ 
departments arranged in a long-term stable structure.10 New priorities (like prices and incomes 
controls) quickly frayed this structure around the edges but its underlying shape lasted quite 
well into the mid 1990s. 
Revisiting the Haldane categories in a 2008 report for Booz & Company, Lord Andrew Turnbull 
(a former Cabinet Secretary) notes further challenges to the service-focused structures such as 
“producer capture, seen most acutely at the Ministry of Argriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), 
and poor coordination across government, with blinkers replacing focus”.11 His report provides 
an interesting and ambitious history of department evolution since Haldane. 
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 Turnbull identifies an evolution of department types through nine categories, starting from 
the Haldane service model to one which he terms ‘synthesis’ (described as bringing together 
overlapping policy issues to produce better coordination and resolution of priorities under 
one roof), to ‘customer-focused’ departments with various external conflict resolution and 
accountability arrangements for both policy and delivery. He finds clear trends: 
The service focus model is in decline, tainted by siloism and producer 
capture. As is synthesis within large departments which are difficult to 
manage and lack transparency about decision making. I believe the trend 
is towards customer focus, defined accountability with external dispute 
resolution, independence and separation of powers.12 
Figure 9 shows an attempted classification of recent departmental changes into a hybrid of 
Turnbull and Haldane’s categories. We use what we see as the main department reconfiguration 
trends in Turnbull’s report combined with Haldane’s earlier categories, leaving aside the changes 
to accountability and structures which led to the creation of arms-length bodies. Three main 
changes are noticeable. Reorganisations in the early 1980s under the Conservatives fitted 
closely into either Haldane’s service orientation or Turnbull’s synthesising model on programme 
lines. Labour have focused on reorientating government to respond to external challenges along 
client lines often externalising disputes when large departments proved unwieldy. Perhaps 
the best example of this is the continuous fragmentation of the synthesised Department 
of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) into more narrow departments with 
externalised dispute resolution arrangements for cross-cutting themes via Cabinet. In some 
cases, as in the Department for Transport (DfT), the externalising of disputes has led back to 
the service-focused Haldane model. 
The culmination of the Department evolutions so far, in our view, lies with the creation of 
customer-focused matrix-management structures such as the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families (DCSF). As Turnbull points out in his report, the matrix management techniques, 
where a focus on the customer is achieved without large-scale machinery of government 
changes, is common in the private sector.13 
In fact, a recent report from Deloitte, New Shapes and Sizes: Reshaping Public Sector 
Organisations for a Period of Austerity, notes that increasing agility in government can 
be achieved by focusing on organisational shape and building flexibility into government 
structures.14 It observes five different evolution types since 1990, culminating in an activity-
focused organisation with flexible resourcing based on a professional services firm model. The 
flexible-resourcing success case used in the Deloitte Report is based specifically on RENEW, the 
2006 strategy refresh at DEFRA, which Deloitte was commissioned to develop and implement. 
With RENEW, staff register skills and a resourcing team deploys them based on changing 
priorities – a strategy which some feel is inappropriate for the whole of DEFRA’s activities but 
which on the whole supports what Turnbull noted as a trend toward greater adaptability and 
flexibility in meeting customer needs.15 
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 Figure 9: Categorising some main department changes, 1979-2009 
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Department Structures are defined as follows: Service focus is structured according to the services to be performed. Synthesis structures 
reunify overlapping or conflicting areas in one department based on the theory of internal dispute resolution. Narrow structures have 
clearly defined objectives with external conflict resolution. Customer focus structures are focused on persons or customer classes. 
Customer by Matrix refers to customer focus without major machinery of government changes using Matrix Management principles from 
the private sector. 
The pace of change in the UK and other countries 
How exceptional is the UK in the extent to which ministries and departments are rearranged? 
Much of the existing literature seems to suggest that the British core executive changes 
more than that in other countries, and seems particularly influenced by a contrast between 
the regular pulses of change in the UK compared with the high levels of stability in the 
departmental structure of the US federal government.16 However, the United States is a 
constitutional outlier on many different dimensions, and especially in the unusual division 
of control over the federal administration between the Presidency and Congress. All US 
departmental reorganisations have to be approved by Congress, and changes are generally 
opposed because of their inevitably disruptive effects on the existing structure of congressional 
committees and sub-committees, many of whose powerful incumbents often stand to lose out 
from any reorganisation. So if we set the exceptionally static USA to one side, a wider series of 
comparisons can be made with the more ‘advanced’ liberal democratic countries included in 
the OECD. 
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 Turning to the narrower but arguably more applicable comparison of Westminster style 
systems (both parliamentary and electoral), our research finds that the pace of administrative 
reorganisations in the UK is not particularly high. For example, compared with the 25 UK 
department reconfigurations between 1979 and 2009, we calculate that Canada experienced 
at least 24.17 
The types of change in the UK and other countries 
In terms of structural change, we find that the evolution in the type of UK department 
configurations over time fits with the general pattern of department evolution in OECD 
countries. Figure 10 is an analysis of department name changes in 2003 and 2009 in 23 OECD 
countries. The titles of departments do not reveal the extent of all activities in the departments 
themselves, however there is important political signalling value in how government 
departments are named. We coded the departments into categories and tracked the changes 
from 2003 to 2009 to see whether trends could be found in international department changes. 
(Note that classifications control for superficial naming idiosyncrasies.) 
The same 15 or so basic departments occur across countries both in 2003 and 2009. The top 
cluster of bars show the most generally present functions and they are all evident in the current 
structure of Whitehall. The UK also has almost none of the rarely found ministries. The main 
exception is the Cabinet Office, found in only one other country, with most nations having 
a Prime Minister’s Office instead. Even this distinction is arguably partly symbolic in modern 
UK government. 
The change from 2003 to 2009 indicates a similar shift across countries from singularly focused 
departments, what we called silos, to cross-cutting departments. The ministries being abolished 
or merged into larger entities in this period were more concentrated in three areas: justice, 
business and the environment. For example, where Justice was mainly a singularly focused 
‘silo’ function in 2003, in 2009 across our sample, five countries merged the Justice function 
with another function. The environment departments were merged with other functions in 
six countries. Similarly, five economic departments (in the case of the UK, the Department 
for Trade and Industry) were merged with other functions across our sample in the same time 
period and in one case, the focus on the ‘Economy’ in naming was lost altogether. 
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 Figure 10: The changing configurations of central government departments in 23 
OECD countries from 2003 – 2009 
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Figure 11 shows that the overall trend within the OECD countries moves away from single-
focus siloed departments with a specialist set of skills and approaches (such as defence, foreign 
affairs, justice and interior) towards non-siloed approaches, combining connected functions (as 
with agriculture, environment and business) – again an area where UK patterns seem broadly 
consistent with the overall OECD trend. Of particular interest is that although there is ample 
change in department reconfigurations, the overall number of departments across our sample is 
only reduced by one – an indication that cabinet size considerations remain a pressing concern 
for government leaders. 
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 The analysis strongly suggests that across the OECD, while the machinery of government 
can be changed to suit new prime-ministerial or government priorities, many traditional 
departmental structures have remained more or less intact. Policy areas that are emerging or 
growing in salience often require new structures (such as business, the environment and most 
recently climate change) and countries are experimenting with an array of configurations for 
tackling established areas of activity whose scale and external context has changed. 
Figure 11: Trends toward fragmentation of departments in OECD countries 
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The process of change in the UK and other countries 
We noted at the beginning of this report that changes of departments decided upon by 
the Prime Minister can be undertaken using Crown prerogative powers, with parliamentary 
approval being sought afterwards as a fait accompli. However, there is always a statutory 
basis for reorganisations. Since the 1975 Ministers of the Crown Act the main method for 
creating departments has been to announce the new arrangements and then to lay Transfer of 
Functions Orders before Parliament, which are subject to the ‘negative resolution’ procedure. In 
practice this means that debate on the Order is not guaranteed even if Members of Parliament 
chose to ‘pray against them’, that is raise objections. The Public Administration Select 
Committee noted: 
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 Procedural changes in the Commons over the years have meant that 
debates on any negative instruments have become the exception rather 
than the rule. Even if an Order has been prayed against, debate only takes 
place if the Government gives an opportunity for it, either in Committee or 
on the Floor of the House. It is at the Government’s discretion if and where 
prayers are debated. If the debate is in Committee, there may then be no 
opportunity for a division on an effective motion.18 
In addition, Figure 12 shows that Transfer of Function Orders are rarely brought forward in less 
than two months and in many recent changes have taken around five months to be moved. For 
instance, when DEFRA was created in June 2001 its main predecessor, MAFF, was only formally 
dissolved in November 2002, several months after all its staff had been transferred to DEFRA 
and the new department was up and running. 
New statutory functions, or the cessation of existing statutory functions, both require primary 
legislation that allow much greater parliamentary scrutiny. However, such changes are often 
not needed. A rare and recent example of where such legislation was used was in the creation 
of the Department for Constitutional Affairs where, in 2005, the Constitutional Reform Act 
confirmed the changes to the judiciary proposed in 2003. 
Limited advance consultation Other features of the UK’s system contribute to the public 
impression that Prime Ministers’ can change Whitehall structures very easily, perhaps even 
on a whim, chiefly because under current UK practice there is often very little advance 
consultation or discussion of changes. Instead the possibility of reorganisation is normally 
kept very secret and not communicated to anyone outside the Prime Minister, the Cabinet 
Secretary and (usually at very short notice before the Prime Minister’s announcement) the 
ministers and permanent secretaries of the affected departments. 
The logic of this way of proceeding does have a political rationale within the UK’s strongly 
adversarial parliamentary system, where Her Majesty’s Opposition sees it as its first task to 
critique the government’s perceived failings. The official justification of suddenly announced 
and ill-prepared changes is that it would be unsettling (indeed intolerable) for cabinet 
ministers still in post to learn that their department was perhaps losing major functions or 
closing down; thus a swift and immediately effective change must be engineered. 
There have also been occasions when senior ministers have told the Prime Minister that 
they would meet any reorganisations taking functions away from their department by 
resigning, risking serious political damage and potentially prematurely wrecking the timings 
of cabinet reshuffles: 
You can’t consult the departments because the relevant permanent 
secretary and secretary of state would oppose it if they were faced with 
taking away a part of their department. For example moving [function A] 
from [Department X] to [Department Y]. Everyone thought there was a 
good case for moving it out of [X] but as soon as it became known we were 
looking at that, [Minister Z] came out and opposed it... and it had to be put 
on ice until he had gone.19 
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 Figure 12: The legislative process for MoG changes in Whitehall 
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Whilst politically useful with respect to governance arrangements in the short-term, the 
process of shock announcements can lead to poorly planned department changes. The 
creation of the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) is one example of such a change 
where several interviewees understood why it was announced so suddenly and yet felt that 
the process was significantly flawed. One interviewee close to the change explained that 
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 the separation of powers between the judiciary and legislature would not have occurred had 
more open debate taken place. He explained that the judiciary and Lord Chancellor were 
extremely comfortable with the status quo, those who wanted change did not have much of 
a voice and therefore the only way around this was to effect a sort of ‘coup’.20 
The process, however, was still seen as inadequate by other interviewees. The DCA, after 
all, was the one change since 1979 that required legislative approval and the Prime Minister 
was not prepared for this. As one interviewee noted, “It’s always dangerous to say we had 
to do it quickly, without any debate, because otherwise it wouldn’t have happened. In my 
experience, that’s how really disastrous decisions are taken.”21 
In the following paragraphs we look at how announcements and operational processes are 
managed in other countries. We find that whilst the amount of transparency surrounding 
department reconfigurations can vary, the processes used by other Westminster-
style systems can help minimise the level of disruption that may occur when shock 
announcements are made. 
The ‘cost-neutral’ doctrine discourages proper planning The tendency for Prime 
Ministers to make poorly planned changes may also be perversely encouraged by the 
Treasury’s consistently maintained (but not especially realistic) position that Whitehall 
reorganisations must always be cost-neutral. The Treasury stance means that no more 
money is made available to a new or reorganised department than was provided in 
previous approved expenditures, even if the net effect of a set of changes is to enlarge the 
overall number of departments, and hence to multiply the number of private office and 
communications sets-ups providing key services to a secretary of state and a set of junior 
ministers. In modern terms this departmental core usually numbers around 130 civil service 
staff, some very senior, and costs around £15m a year to provide. The new department 
is expected to cover such elements by finding compensating savings from elsewhere 
within its existing or transferred-in budgets. This is a very difficult thing to do quickly and 
without much (or indeed any) preparation time. The Treasury stance certainly implies that 
if a net addition is made to the number of departments through a demerger or from the 
new creation of a department, then some stakeholders in the departments affected by 
reorganisation will lose out as money is top-sliced to meet additional corporate-centre costs. 
By contrast, mergers and transfers of functions normally pose no equivalent immediate 
problem of funding. (However, merged departments often confront the duplication of 
functions in corporate services. Staff tend to be cut or reassigned as a result which, while not 
necessarily a costly exercise, provokes job-insecurity and uncertainty in the organisation.) 
In thinking about the UK’s process for reorganising departments it is perhaps most useful 
to compare it with those of other reasonably large ‘Westminster-model’ systems. These 
have similar political and constitutional set-ups, such as a predominance of single-party 
governments, strong party discipline in the legislature, and a strong executive subject 
to relatively weak prior legislative control over its actions. The closest parallels here are 
Australia and Canada and Figure 12 shows that there are many areas of comparison across 
the three countries – including the announcement of departmental changes at short notice, 
their decision by the premier almost alone, and the PM’s ability to announce changes first 
and seek legislative approval of them only well after the fact. 
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 Both Canada and Australia, however, have more robust change-management processes in 
advance or post-change than the UK. In Canada, most department reconfigurations are 
solidified in statute and whilst new departments are operationalonce announced, significant 
changes may be delayed until legislative approval is acquired. Although not a foolproof 
strategy to mitigate ill-conceived government reorganisations, Canadian conventions provide 
an added incentive for the Prime Minister to ensure department changes are based on sound 
rationale because the alternative is to face certain defeat in the House of Commons. 
For instance, in December 2003, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Paul Martin, separated 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) into a Department 
named Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and another named International Trade Canada 
(ITCan). Whilst the two departments were operationally and legally existent from the 
time of their announcement, legislation to formally abolish DFAIT and provide a statutory 
basis for a separate FAC and a ITCan failed to pass a first vote in the Canadian House of 
Commons in February 2005 – over a year after their creation. The Prime Minister faced 
media scrutiny over this change both before and after the defeat in the Commons. In late 
2004, a prominent Globe and Mail columnist, Jeffrey Simpson, famously described Prime 
Minister Martin’s decision to split the departments as “an idea so splendidly stupid that 
literally no one in Ottawa will admit to having favoured it.”22 The uncertainty surrounding 
the departments had an obvious effect on their operations: the 2005 FAC Department 
Management Accountability Framework Assessment (the Canadian version of UK 
Department Capability Reviews) notes that “as a result of 2003 machinery of government 
changes, there was a lack of legal certainty of organisational structures and authorities. 
Consequently, there was a significantly increased risk of breakdown in financial authorities 
and delegations for effective control and accountability.”23 The Prime Minister set up a 
Blue Ribbon Panel to advise the government on next steps after facing the defeat in the 
Commons and finally in 2006, the two were amalgamated back into their original structure. 
The Australian process does not require affirmative resolution of change but it does provide 
for much post-change guidance and support from the centre in ensuring the department 
has the capacity to meet the goals of the change. In Australia, departmental reorganisations 
also have implications for the ‘portfolio structure’ of budgets and programmes funded 
by them, and the Senate provides a less partisan and more considered coverage of public 
administration issues than occurs in either of the other two countries. 
The UK is not strongly out of line with other parliamentary democracies The UK’s 
current arrangements for achieving departmental changes and reorganisations, while flexible 
and short-termist in their set up, are not dissimilar to those in most other parliamentary 
liberal democracies. Nor are the results of the UK’s cumulative changes very different from 
those of other OECD countries. Finally the tempo of machinery of government changes has 
not been especially unusual in the overall context of post-war changes across countries, 
although it has been high in Gordon Brown’s first two years in office, as is common with 
other new premiers. 
None of this in any way suggests that the UK’s current practices are in any sense optimised 
or even working tolerably well. Figure 13 shows a comparison of the UK’s processes around 
MoG changes with the otherwise quite similar governments of Canada and Australia. 
Though this figure focuses on time spent rather than quality per se, it strongly suggests that 
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 such changes in the UK are more rushed – and therefore arguable more ill-considered and 
ill-prepared – than those elsewhere. A theoretical counter-argument is that the swiftness 
of MoG changes in Britain brings with it decisiveness, and even a deliberate element of 
disruptive surprise. To better understand this change process and test these potentially 
competing interpretations, we turn in the next chapter to how reorganisations are seen by 
most senior civil servants closely involved with them. 
Figure 13: Assessment of the key stages of MoG in Canada, Australia and the UK 
Stage Key Inputs 
CANADA AUSTRALIA UK 
Pre­planning PM PM PM 
PCO PM&C CO 
Preparation after 
announcement 
3­5 days 3­5 days None 
Parliamentary  Confirmed None unless None unless 
consultation  via legislation† new legislation new legislation 
HR  transfer TBS PSC 
DFD 
None 
IT transfer TBS None None 
Budget transfer TBS DFD CO 
Accountability TBS DFD PASC 
Black shading indicates relative activity for each stage of MoG change for each country. More black shading indicates a greater level of 
activity. Pre-planning is defined as the amount of time and rigour spent planning change in advance of announcements. Preparation after 
announcement is defined as the stage between announcement and the operational commencement of new departments. Parliamentary 
consultation refers to the stage where Parliament is consulted on changes. HR transfer refers to human resources transfer support provided, 
IT transfer requires to IT transfer support provided, Budget transfer refers to budget support provided and Accountability refers to the 
amount and body which is ultimately accountable for scrutinising the change. † The Canadian PM can change the machinery of government 
by prerogative order however in practice this is exceptional, not least because most of Canada’s government machinery, including most 
government entities, have been given a basis in statute, which the Prime Minister cannot unilaterally change. 
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 2. The views and experience of the 
senior civil service 
When departments are reconfigured, senior civil servants are charged with implementing 
the change and they have to ensure that a new or remodelled department becomes quickly 
operational. They are necessarily concerned by operational processes and administrative 
effectiveness, yet the senior civil service also has a strong ethic of bi-partisan loyalty to 
meeting the needs of elected politicians, and to not questioning political value-judgments  
made by the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet colleagues. The juxtaposition of these 
at times contradictory themes were consistently repeated in the 25 interviews that we 
conducted with senior civil servants, all of whom have been closely involved in one or more 
Whitehall reorganisations. 
Little time for preparation 
Whilst interviewees did share their personal perspectives on how departments should be set 
up, our focus here is to compare their experiences of departmental changes. Most criticism – 
and sometimes dismay – was focused on the lack of preparation time in the days leading up 
to the changes. Figure 14 shows that the majority of new or demerged departments between 
1979 and 2009 were implemented with less than four days to prepare for creating the new 
or remodelled department. A small majority of mergers were given additional time – in a few 
cases over 10 days. These more extended timeframes tended to be for the largest changes, 
especially the creation of the Department of Work and Pensions (for which preparatory work 
and political debate went on for a lengthy period), the creation of HMRC from Inland Revenue 
and Customs (which merged two non-ministerial departments into one) and the transfer of 
prison and probation functions from the Home Office to the Ministry of Justice (following on 
from a lengthy internal review of problems in the Home Office). 
The DWP and HMRC changes were unsurprisingly better planned and longer prepared than 
most Whitehall reorganisations, with relatively more thorough business plans and transition 
strategies, because each of these giant departments employed over 100,000 staff, accounted 
for more than a fifth of the UK civil service personnel, and have running costs in the billions of 
pounds. However, the multi-step transition of the Lord Chancellor’s department to becoming a 
ministry of justice (via being the Department of Constitutional Affairs) is an example of a larger 
Whitehall change that also involved big agencies (NOMs and the prison service) and where 
changes were arguably less well planned. 
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 Figure 14: Preparation time for department change 
Preparation time for change Time required to refocus department 
10 7 3 8 7 3 
40% 
57% 
67% 
10% 
50% 
43% 
33% 
0­4 days < 1 year 
1 week > 1 year 
2+ years > 10 days 
25% 
71% 
33% 
25% 
67% 
50% 
29% 
Merger Demerger New Merger Demerger New 
Preparation time: time given to senior civil service and transition teams to prepare department for change in advance of first day of business. 
Time required to refocus department: time taken to configure department business processes, culture and systems toward new change mandate. 
Results based on codification of 18 senior civil servants involved in department level machinery of government changes between 1979-2009. 
Back of the envelope calculations 
In most reconfigurations, interviewees explained that the relatively narrow windows of time 
available for preparing organisations for business, or what the civil service termed ‘going live’, 
constrains the transition teams in what can be properly assembled. In most reorganisations 
between 1979 and 2009 there was a focus on getting communications and some departmental 
branding sorted in order for the department to appear cohesive from day one. However little 
time was left for the essential but longer-term issues around synergy identification, corporate 
planning, or even how best to set-up the human resources, operations and finance. An official 
at DIUS during its creation noted: 
We only had about three days, which is pretty standard for most 
machinery of government changes. The difference here is that it was a 
brand new department which is often underplayed. We were creating 
three departments from two... So on day one, you had ministers but no 
ministerial offices, you had files and people but no HR function, a budget 
but no finance function... That was the core of the tasks... just trying to get 
the basics in place.24 
Senior civil servants acknowledge that a degree of planning and discussion of departmental 
changes does occur amongst politicians, but in most cases they see the resulting conclusions 
as producing little more than a broadly defined vision. By the time top officials are briefed 
by the Cabinet Office, they normally encounter what they see as ‘back of the envelope’ type 
calculations and strategies only. This is true even in cases where the Economic and Domestic 
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 Affairs Secretariat, the section of the Cabinet Office that advises on machinery of government 
change, has had an opportunity to advise the PM in more detail on proposed changes. 
This situation usually arises because the advisory process on administrative possibilities 
and options is tightly constrained by lack of time and lack of transparency. Officials called 
in to advise on changes or plan the new set-ups are not able to consult widely within the 
departments that will be subject to change, for fear of sparking political rows amongst ministers 
or provoking embarrassing leaks to the media. 
Politics is the decisive driving factor for change 
Top officials strongly take the view that the vast majority of departmental reorganisations 
occur primarily as a response to political pressures at Cabinet level, including both the need to 
create jobs to satisfy a particularly valuable member of Cabinet as well as the need to contain 
the size of Cabinet – with policy and delivery requirements taking second priority (Figure 
15). Other political factors also play some role, such as the departure of a minister who has 
previously blocked change, and the PM’s wish to signal a new policy priority to voters or the 
media. Pressure from stakeholders or media criticisms rarely feature in officials’ lists of political 
influences. Instead the primary drivers of reconfigurations involve powerful ministers aligning 
themselves with issues, departmental briefs and the PM’s priorities. 
A former official in the Cabinet Office explained that he was often faced with this scenario 
when advising on changes. The regular (annual) reshuffle of cabinet roles is a time when 
both cabinet formation and political signalling priorities assume great importance, and when 
institutional innovations sometimes occur at short notice. Indeed, he noted that during 
reshuffles, a Prime Minister is often faced with competing objectives: wanting to reward 
politicians with influential portfolios whilst at the same time meeting the long-term needs of 
Whitehall without putting too much strain on the size of Cabinet. In the end, he explained that 
decisions were made quickly and the balance of factors rested with the political need to keep 
Ministers happy: 
We do it all the time… In the process of a reshuffle, a few [switches or 
moves] happen and then you get Number 10 ringing up and saying: “The 
PM wants to keep X person happy. What can we give him to do?” . . . [It’s a] 
very ad hominen arrangement. Some [changes] which turn out to be quite 
beneficial, but they were not based on any great analysis, nor was there 
time for it. When the question comes, very often you only have half an hour 
to find the answer. Literally half an hour. Sometimes less. 
34  2. The views and experience of the senior civil service 
 Figure 15: A breakdown of the drivers of department reorganisations 
Politics 
29% 
Delivery 
48% 
Policy  39% 
18% 
18% 
10% 
12% 
4% 
Job creation/empire­building 
PM interest 
Cabinet formation 
Signalling 
Minister departure 
Media reporting/ 
stakeholder pressure 
23% 
Job creation/empire building is defined as the need to create jobs to satisfy a particularly valuable member of Cabinet. Cabinet formation 
refers to the need to contain the size of Cabinet PM interest is defined as driven by the Prime Minister’s personal interests. Minister 
departure refers to the need to reshuffle departments as a result of a Minister resigning his or her role. Signalling is defined as the desire to 
show the electorate and other stakeholders that a certain issue is a priority. Media reporting/stakeholder pressure refers to public demands 
to change the management or direction of a department. 
We further asked interviewees to comment on the primary drivers for all the departmental 
reconfigurations between 1979 and 2009. Figure 16 categorizes these responses into ‘delivery’ 
concerns, where changes followed directly from service-driven needs or imperatives; ‘policy’ 
reasons, where the change responded most to either environmental or internal administrative 
rationales; and ‘political’ reasons of an especially short-term or cabinet-making kind. Not all 
departments during this period are represented: we invited interviewees to comment only on 
those reorganisations where they felt they could provide a considered view. In their general 
comments our respondents stressed political motivations for changes around two thirds 
of the time, with the remainder evenly split between delivery and policy rationales. But in 
commenting on specific named reorganisations, top officials often acknowledged a stronger 
role for delivery and policy concerns. Clearly the most ‘political’ of the reorganisations was 
identified as the Office of Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), the vehicle for salving John Prescott’s 
loss of a ministerial role. Earlier and related changes in that area (such as the initial creation 
of the very large Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) in 1997 and 
the later recreation of a Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)) also 
were seen as mainly political. Less politically dominated changes included the creation of the 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). 
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 Figure 16: The number of times that three different kinds of reorganisation drivers 
were cited about different reorganisations (from interviews with 25 senior 
civil servants) 
Department for Education and Employment 
Department for International Development 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
Department for Communities and Local Government 
Department for Transport, Local government and the Regions 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Affairs 
Department of Health 
Department for Transport 
Department for Constitutional Affairs 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 
Department for National Heritage 
Department for Children, Schools and Families 
Department for Social Security 
Department for Energy and Climate Change 
Department for Work and Pensions 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Ministry of Justice 
0  5  10  15  20  25 
No. of times theme is cited 
Delivery  Policy  Politics 
*The bars indicate the number of times the three driving factors were cited in interviews for each machinery of government change. 
Dunkirk spirit amongst transition teams 
This need to respond fast often produces a ‘Dunkirk spirit’ amongst the embattled officials of 
the affected departments. One of the recurring themes of our interviews with senior officials is 
the resilience of the civil service in serving the political needs of ministers and the government. 
Some interviewees described to us the absurd timetables they faced for accomplishing 
taxing departmental reorganisations, and yet also their organisations’ strong capability for 
accommodating such ‘political’ demands: 
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 Although this was a complete shock to the department, by the following 
Monday morning it was up and running and there were no bad feelings – 
because the civil service doesn’t do bad feelings, and we were all as sweet as 
pie. We worked over the weekend and by the Monday the minister would 
have thought: “Oh, piece of cake – this was undoubtedly well-planned”. 
The stress and strains are absorbed by the system, and the ministers don’t 
see them.25 
This responsiveness and ability to cope in crises or difficulties (however they may be induced) 
is rightly seen as one of strongest capabilities of the British senior civil service, with top staff 
and officials well down the line all rallying around to produce smooth organisational paths for 
ministers even in the most difficult circumstances. 
However, the way department reconfigurations are announced and effectively created is also 
a period of high stress and very high workloads that longer planning might well have alleviated 
or avoided altogether. Moreover, for civil servants, planning time is of great importance, not 
only in terms of preparing an organisational change, but because of the emphasis they place on 
being able to deliver a high quality of service for their secretary of state and other ministers. 
The current process of department reconfigurations does not allow for such a professional 
approach to management change. Unfortunately it often boils down to civil servants relying 
on the new department’s image and brand as the first test of whether it is delivering for its 
political masters: 
The moment the Secretary of State walked into the door, this had to be the 
[Department of X], right down to making sure the old sign was taken down 
and the new sign screwed up. Those first moments are absolutely crucial in 
establishing the relationship and you want the Secretary of State to feel that 
I am in the [Department of X] and these people are competent.26 
Resistance to change 
Beyond the shock of the first few weeks, the longer-term organisational set-up of reorganised 
departments is complex, and normally involves some fraught negotiations with related or 
predecessor departments. Most senior officials involved in reorganisations also felt that they 
experienced significant resistance to change within their new organisations, which normally 
resulted in larger disruption costs and an increased delivery risk during the transition period. 
Figure 17 shows what senior civil servants felt were the top issues involved in MoG changes 
(as a percentage of changes in which the issue was raised.) Resistance to change is the top 
issue cited with 81% of reorganisations between 1979 and 2009 affected. Several interviewees 
explained that improper planning and the shock announcements can reinforce both resistance 
to change and increase home loyalties. 
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 Figure 17: Top issues cited by senior civil servants involved in department 
reconfigurations (as a percentage of department changes between 1979-2009) 
Resistance to change 
No planning/shock 
Home loyalties 
Cultural challenges 
Staff morale 
Anger 
Informal/superficial planning 
Delivery risk 
No support 
Disruption 
29% 
29% 
29% 
29% 
24% 
38% 
38% 
43% 
62% 
81% 
The lack of planning and 
limited consultation with 
the civil service reinforces 
staff resistance to change. 
Results based on codification of interviews with 18 senior civil servants involved in department level machinery of government changes 
between 1979–2009. 
Some changes are seen as positive 
It would be possible to interpret the responses in Figure 17 in a hostile manner, reflecting 
the conservatism of civil servants with comfortable roles not wanting to innovate for the 
future. But this would be far from an accurate picture, for top officials were more than ready 
to acknowledge the need for some changes, such as the growing salience of climate change 
issues and the rebounding importance of energy concerns which lay behind the creation of the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in 2009. 
Indeed, one senior official in our interviews clearly welcomed some of the changes that they 
were involved in: 
With [Department P], people needed renewing and we needed some 
different people to take a fresh look. And quite honestly, it’s just easier to do 
something like that if you’re making a major structural change. And that’s 
the positive by-product of one of these MoG changes. 
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 In addition, almost all top officials conceded that some Whitehall reorganisations had proved 
well-founded and relatively successful. Figure 18 shows how our interviewees viewed the 
success of department changes from 1979-2009. The Department of Work and Pensions 
formed in 2001, the new Department of Energy and Climate Change created in 2008 and the 
creation of the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in 2001 attracted the most 
positive praise amongst our interviewees. It is worth noting, however, that this question was 
unprompted and so a certain amount of memory recall is at play. 
A number of earlier changes, such as the splitting of the Department of Health and Social 
Security in 1988, were recalled and mentioned positively by only two interviewees, with one 
official describing the process as similar to dividing an orange into its component parts.27 Yet 
even here, politics and poor planning had some effects: 
DHSS was created [originally in 1968] in order to provide a department 
big enough to justify a cabinet seat for [Secretary of State]. It followed 
from that, that the two departments were not necessarily coherent as an 
organisation and indeed they weren’t.28 
Once the change was effected in 1988, in the words of an interviewee, “there was a great sigh 
of relief because the ‘Social Security’ people didn’t really want to have anything with ‘Health’ 
and the ‘Health’ people didn’t really want to have anything to do with ‘Social Security’. So they 
thanked the heavens and turned native so to speak.”29 
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Figure 18: How top officials view the successes or problems of recent reorganisation 
7 
9 
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5 2Defra (2001) 
5 5MoJ (2007) 
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Results based on codification of 18 senior civil servants involved in department level machinery of government changes between 
19792009. 
Department names were unprompted leading to less commentary for later changes. 
We consider the lifecycle of department creations for the DWP, DECC, DEFRA and DCSF/DIUS 
in the following chapter but it is worth digressing briefly here to consider the series of unique 
changes that progressively created an integrated MoJ. 
Creating the Ministry of Justice 
The series of changes from Lord Chancellor’s Department to Department for Constitutional 
Affairs and eventually culminating in the Ministry of Justice is unique in the time period of 
our study because it is the sole reconfiguration that required primary legislation, that is, 
the approval of both houses of Parliament to confirm the changes announced by the Prime 
Minister. Moreover, the changes moved a previously weak, courts-orientated ministry (the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department) first into being a Department for Constitutional Affairs in 2003 
with the Supreme Court coming into being, and then to taking over the National Offender 
Management System from a failing Home Office in 2005 to become the current MoJ. 
 Department for Constitutional Affairs: The question of process is an important one 
starting with the announcement and creation of the DCA in 2003. Whilst the Prime Minister 
announced the changes as a fait accompli, subsequent legal requirements meant that it was 
not until 2005 that the changes were in fact confirmed in Parliament. Senior officials we 
spoke to were divided about whether the process that the Prime Minister followed was the 
correct one to handle not just a machinery of government change, but what is seen as a 
significant change to the history and role of the British judiciary. 
Some acknowledge that there were rows which followed the DCA announcement but see 
the net change as highly worthwhile and fundamental: 
The series of changes [involving] the creation of the Supreme Court, ending 
Lord Chancellor as politician, establishing proper judicial appointments 
and ending the anomaly whereby a Minister was ex-officio speaker over the 
House of Lords, [were] well thought out – and it was just a question of how 
to do it.30 
Indeed, some felt the lack of consultation was necessary to bring about the change. 
Others, however, felt that unilateral decisions of this sort can cause serious problems.31 The 
question of whether greater consultation, or specifically in this case, greater planning for 
the introduction of an Act in Parliament, would have reduced the conflict or even thwarted 
the effort to separate the powers of the judiciary, will likely fade with time and those who 
were involved with the change. A salient point remains, though, regarding the role of politics 
in the process of change, whether a Parliamentary Act is required or not: merely two years 
after the Constitutional Reform Act was passed, the Ministry of Justice was created under 
similarly contentious circumstances. 
Ministry of Justice: The eventual creation of the MoJ further highlights the role that 
politics can play in many department reconfigurations. Whilst again a fundamental policy 
or administrative rationale may be present, the immediate context around changes is seen 
as politically-oriented. One interviewee explained that moving the prisons service to the 
MoJ had worked at one level but that the process of change and consequences remained 
challenging for the management team: 
You have a core of the old Lord Chancellor’s Department – relatively small 
– and now it has quadrupled in size in over a decade and it has taken a 

long time to build a culture. It’s still very far from complete.32
�
For MoJ, the challenge will not be resolved with an Act of Parliament. The change process 
it is undergoing is still seen to be in early stages and while the MoJ actually had the longest 
preparation time in all the departments we have studied, six weeks, before the change 
was enacted, the lack of planning for such a large-scale organisational change pales in 
comparison to what would be expected in the private sector. One official involved in the 
planning team noted that: 
In the best MoG changes, politicians decide early on for the right reasons 
that they are interested in a change. There will be major policy or delivery 
benefits from reordering the functions of government. Then they ask the 
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 Cabinet Office to examine the potential changes in some depth. That 
occasionally happens but it’s not the norm. An example of where it did 
was splitting the Home Office and the formation of MoJ. After [a minister] 
briefed the Sunday Times that he felt the Home Office was unmanageable, 
the Prime Minister asked [X] to work on a plan for six weeks with the two 
departments and [they] produced a case for doing it… [That exercise] drew 
the lines of who should go where, the functions, the people, how much 
money and a crude look at costs. That’s the best you can hope for. 
Nonetheless, on the whole, the question of the success and endurance of the MoJ with 
respect to its core functions was not disputed across our entire interview panel. The future 
of its individual parts, however, remained open to debate. 
Politics and process 
While senior civil servants acknowledge the strength of the political factors involved, and are 
proud of the civil service’s ability to loyally accommodate and help implement Prime Ministerial 
or other political imperatives, the stress in their interviews was predominantly upon the process 
and various costs of change. The experience of the MoJ, certainly with the major changes 
required via the Constitutional Reform Act to confirm the changes to the judiciary, is unique in 
its requirement to gain approval of the change. To shed more light upon the benefits and costs 
of reorganisations which are perhaps more typical, and to get more a of a grip on the longer 
term implications of Whitehall changes, we look at a number of recent changes in more detail 
in the next chapter. 
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 3. UK case studies
�
There is currently no regular or systematic information kept in Whitehall on the costs and 
benefits of departmental reorganisations. So in this section we look in detail at five case studies 
of recent changes under the new Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Our 
cases cover: 
•	� the creation of DEFRA, spanning across agriculture, food and environment in 2001; 
•	� the large-scale amalgamation of social security and employment services into the 
Department of Work and Pensions in 2001; 
•	� the setting up of the Department for Children, School and Families and the simultaneous 
creation of the (as it turned out) short-lived Department for Innovation, Universities and 
Skills in mid 2008; 
•	� and the creation of the Department for Energy and Climate Change in mid 2009. 
Before looking at these creations in detail, it is worth noting the variable impacts of department 
reconfigurations. The costings in Figure 19 are estimates of the costs of DECC, DIUS, DEFRA 
and DWP respectively. Since department reconfigurations are deemed to be cost neutral, there 
is little incentive for individual departments to track in any detailed manner. As such, we have 
reconstructed them to the best of our ability based on cost estimates of select changes and the 
creation of a Department Change Cost Model. The model is based on interviews with senior 
civil servants, Department annual reports and documentation of change, Civil Service Statistics 
and Select Committee hearing minutes. 
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 Figure 19: Costs of select department reconfigurations, 1979-2009 
£15,687,500  £15,289,600  £31,041,700  £173,374,300 
First year 
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% of administrative 
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Cost estimates of MoG Changes based on IfG Cost Model. Model based on interviews with senior civil servants, department annual reports 
and documentation of change, Civil Service Statistics and Select Committee Hearing Minutes. First-year costs are tangible costs incurred in 
the first year of the department’s operations. Recurring costs refer to differential pay settlements which were agreed to in the first year of 
the department’s operations as a result of a merger. The settlement may be paid over several years. Increases to salaries as a result of the 
merger remain for the lifetime of the new organisation and therefore are coded as recurring although we do not attempt to predict how 
much these cost beyond the settlement payout. Indirect costs refer to productivity losses which we estimate for disruptive changes. 
We believe the costs for a new policy department and a mid-sized merger to be representative 
of the costs incurred in most department changes – roughly in the neighbourhood of £15m. 
This estimate accords with the recent National Audit Office (NAO) findings in its Reorganisation 
of Central Government report. The NAO’s research covers a more narrow time period of four 
years and is mainly focused on the costs of reconfiguring arms-length bodies: however, they 
note similar challenges to ours in reconstructing data. 
We believe our costs are pretty conservative since they do not include an estimate of disruption 
costs resulting from institutional memory loss, delivery risk or stakeholder relationship losses. 
For the largest merger costs, we use the DWP. It is unusual because DWP endured labour 
disputes and spectacular organisational upheaval in its early years. Nonetheless, it presents 
an important experience for would-be change agents who fail to appreciate the technicalities 
of Whitehall machinery of government changes and how these can present challenges 
previously unconsidered. 
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 Department for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs 
Context 
The general election of 2001 took place shortly after the onset of a substantial crisis in the 
agricultural health field: an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (the first since 1968 in the 
UK). The outbreak quickly mushroomed from a local to a national crisis and was contained 
only with difficulty and at major cost to the Exchequer. This was the second crisis in which the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was widely held to have acted too slowly 
and conservatively, being over-deferential to the interests of farmers – the other occasion being 
the BSE crisis from 1996-2001. Labour governments have always had difficulty in placing good 
ministers in an agriculturally-focused ministry, which is seen as a sideline area for the party, 
and their ministers in 1997-2001 were not political heavyweights. In April 2001 the Institute 
of Public Policy Research (IPPR) proposed a plan for the reorganisation of the DETR after the 
forthcoming General Election. It recommended moving local and regional government into 
a Department for Constitutional Affairs, leaving a manageable and coherent Department of 
Environment and Transport (DET).33 DET would also assume the regulatory and environmental 
responsibilities of an abolished MAFF, and the promotion of the agri-business industry would be 
left to the DTI. 
Tony Blair subsequently went into the general election resolved to change the self-contained 
nature of MAFF, which had endured unaltered through many successive reorganisations of 
government since its original creation in 1947. The Labour party manifesto at the general election 
did not embrace the IPPR proposal, but instead promised the creation of a new Department for 
Rural Affairs, which would support the countryside and lead renewal in rural areas.34 
The Prime Minister, however, was challenged with strengthening the portfolio of the new 
department in the hours immediately following the election. Indeed, it was not until one 
Minister was in his car on the way to what he believed to be his department (at 8:00 am the 
morning after the election), that the call came explaining the new roles and reconfiguration for 
a strengthened DEFRA.35 
By most reckonings outside the government itself, this change was quite rational – the DETR 
was overly large and Prescott’s performance in running it had not been rated by many outside 
commentators as one of the government’s strengths. The management process and lack of 
planning however are striking: “they just put it together. There was no examination of any kind 
at all. It was just done. And most machinery of government changes are just like that.”36 
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 Figure 20: The family tree for DEFRA 
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Notes: MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; DfT Department for Transport; DoE Department of the Environment; DETR 
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Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions; ODPM Office of Deputy Prime Minister; DCLG Department for Communities 
and Local Government. 
Figure 20 shows the ‘family tree’ of DEFRA, with the merger of the environment parts of the 
DETR brief (especially its role in supervising major regulators like the Environment Agency) 
with MAFF. DEFRA’s creation was the first time that a genuinely environmentally focused 
department was created in British government. (The previous Department of the Environment, 
which lasted from 1971 to 1997, was, in fact, a local government, housing, and urban and 
regional development department, so that its environmentally focused activity was only a 
small part of its role for most of this period.) DEFRA’S separating out from DETR started the 
repartition of Prescott’s brief into its component parts, with transport later separating back out 
in 2002. 
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 The change process 
Figure 21: Quick facts on DEFRA’s creation 
Planning prior to announcement 
Number of days to prepare prior to live 
FTE Count – old 
3 
6,280 
FTE Count – new 
Scale of change (% FTEs) 
6,980 
10% 
Scope of change 
Settling­in time 6­9 months 
Time to integration > 2 years 
Black shaded circles are relative measures compared to other case studies based on the researchers comparative analysis. Number of days 
to prepare prior to live indicates the number of days the transition teams were given to prepare the department prior to it being open for 
business. Settling-in time refers to the amount of time required before the department was able to begin to act on its mandate. Time to 
integration refers to the amount of time required before the changed department functioned as a whole. All responses based on interviews 
with senior civil servants. 
No planning 
There was no prior planning for the last-minute change. As one senior official recalled: 
…It was quite clear that various people were talking to Blair in the 
Labour Party. Which we were not privy to at all... Blair’s aim was to do 
something that would alter MAFF and I think he was probably right 
that simply giving it responsibility for rural issues and one NDPB coming 
across wouldn’t have produced anything like DEFRA that we have now for 
obvious reasons. I can see why he ended up doing it... [but] I don’t think a 
lot of thought went into it.37 
The change from the manifesto promise caught them by surprise: 
We were essentially dealing with what the private sector would call an 
unplanned merger – we had done no planning whatsoever, no thinking 
about anything that radical.38 
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 A weekend to prepare 
The top civil servants and the new Secretary of State for DEFRA, were briefed on the Friday 
prior to the official announcement on Monday, giving the team just three days to prepare the 
new department before its formal opening for business. As is apparently the case with most 
other Whitehall changes, this time was a hectic period, requiring the quick setting-up of a 
press office to cover the merged department, website/branding redesigns and other cosmetic 
changes. 
The first year 
The first year of DEFRA is widely acknowledged to have been challenging, with little progress 
made on integration a year after its creation. The interviewees we spoke with explained 
that it took six to nine months to begin to sort out the IT systems, HR systems, and building 
preparations for the new department. Whilst draft aims and objectives were created in the 
days following the department’s creation, the shock of the change required officials to be 
sorting out long-term planning and justifications for the new organisation at the same time as 
undertaking reorganisation issues – all in the midst of the foot-and-mouth crisis. Indeed, one 
official suggested that throughout most of 2001 DEFRA was “sort of in chaotic shambles.” The 
common view is that the department came together two years later in 2003, after much effort 
with respect to cultural integration and synergy identification, so that the department could 
look forward as a whole. 
In common with almost all the reorganisations we studied, the senior staff who had to make 
the DEFRA merger real were struck by an overall lack of central support available, not just in the 
immediate transition but during the subsequent integration phase. Few guidelines or experts 
were available for the budget transfer negotiations, IT integration or legal procedures required 
for DEFRA’s transfers of functions, and future governance arrangements were made up from 
scratch. Many important negotiations were strikingly informal. A senior official involved recalled 
that when a gap was discovered with respect to a resource transfer, the affected parties sorted 
the issue over the phone with no support or planning to determine exactly how the gap should 
be filled. 
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 Figure 22: Major events in the first year at DEFRA 
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Industrial action resulted in 16,201 days lost by PCS staff from the former MAFF and its agencies.41 
A clear rationale 
Despite its rushed nature, the merger that created DEFRA clearly had a substantial rationale 
in countering the public and media impression that MAFF was no longer able to balance 
out farming interests and the public interest, nor to meet the pressures of an evolving 
environmental movement. As one senior official put it: 
The case for integration was overwhelming [with] MAFF. I think MAFF as a 
separate department had become captive of a particular producer interest 
namely the farming industry – they had become the champion for farmers 
in a way that I think had become outdated as far as the British economy is 
concerned – outdated and damaging. I think it was right to get rid of the 
independence of MAFF and bring it into DEFRA.39 
Yet for the merger to work effectively it was important that the new department should quickly 
come to function in an integrated way, and the former MAFF and environmental divisions 
should not retain intact their previous organisational cultures, strongly formed in MAFF’s case 
given the department’s many decades of continuous existence. The two groups of staff were 
also initially wary of the merger from entirely different standpoints. The environment people 
were worried about being linked with the MAFF legacy, whereas MAFF staff, clearly aware of 
the challenges, felt unappreciated and tired in the midst of another agricultural health crisis. 
In the words of one interviewee, they felt: “We’re on our knees, we’re exhausted from foot-and-
mouth, why does everyone hate us?”40 
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 The costs of change 
In addition, the merger faced an immediate difficulty because of the divergence in civil service 
pay levels. Normally the level of difference across related departments is not too serious, but 
in DEFRA’s case the MAFF staff were amongst the lowest paid Whitehall staff in 2001, in the 
bottom quartile of pay levels, whereas the environment divisions were coming from one of the 
higher-paid departments, in the top quartile. The resulting disparities in pay levels within one 
department, created by the merger, lead initially to a period of industrial action by the civil 
service trade unions, which Figure 22 shows plagued much of the new department’s first year, 
with a six month period of June 2001 and January 2002. One interviewee told us that: 
The one very salient lesson from the creation of DEFRA was that of the 
constancy of delegation of pay to departments. Departments had diverged 
quite widely and, in making that change, Blair put together two groups 
of staff that were at opposite ends of the range. You had very poorly paid 
staff at DEFRA and very highly paid staff coming across and that caused a 
lot of trouble and a lot of cost because levelling up was the only thing you 
could do.42 
First-year costs: The industrial dispute itself and necessity for equalising pay had a major 
impact on the overall costs associated with the DEFRA merger. Since a departmental centre 
already existed in MAFF, and the environment portfolio moving from DETR was also already 
in operation, it might have been expected that the creation of DEFRA would be a relatively 
low-cost or even cost-neutral operation. And in terms of the first year tangible or ‘hard’ 
costs of the change, this is basically true – with Figure 23 showing that around £6m of 
extra costs, approximately 4% of the administrative budget, can be directly tagged to the 
reorganisation. 
Recurring costs: The labour dispute resulted in a first pay settlement in August 2001 but 
it was not finally settled until March 2002, and only then by putting in place a scheme 
which concentrated salary increases over the next four years on the former MAFF staff to 
bring them up to par, while holding back increases for the former environment staff. The 
final differential pay settlement scheme in 2002 totalled approximately £15m and was 
implemented over the department’s first four years. Without this relatively costly device, 
it would have been impossible for the new department to move around staff or to achieve 
much of the merging of the organisational cultures and creation of a modernised approach 
that was the basic rationale of the merger. 
Whilst we quantify the differential pay as one-lump sum of £15m, the net cost for DEFRA 
would have been far greater than this over the future lifetime of the department. Once the 
four-year settlement payment mark was reached and the salaries of both the former MAFF 
and DEFRA staff reached par, salary increases would continue for all staff. The additional 
salary increases for the MAFF staff specifically could arguably be quantified as a machinery 
of government change cost. We do not have access to the data to detail what this amount 
might be; but it is an important contributor to the broader cost implications of Whitehall 
machinery of government changes. 
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 Indirect costs: The impact of the industrial dispute and of loss of morale would create a dip 
in the new department’s productivity and also incurred costs albeit indirectly. Although no 
clear-cut data are available here, we apply figures on the conservative end of productivity 
dips for private sector mergers to estimate the cost. Assuming that around a fifth of staff 
will be completely resistant to change, we can implement this as a standard 20% loss in 
productivity for this proportion of staff (i.e. an overall reduction of 4%) which we apply to 
salary costs for each grade in the DEFRA for 10 months43. On this basis we estimate that the 
productivity costs of the reorganisation were at least an additional £10m. 
Figure 23: The costs of creating DEFRA to the end of June 2002 
£10,000,000 £31,041,700 
Accommodation 
HR systems integration 
IT investment 
IT Integration 
Differential pay settlement 
Productivity 
£15,000,000 
£15,000,000 
£31,041,700 
£10,000,000 
£6,041,700 
£1,169,000 
£3,000,000 
£714,100 
£311,000 
First year Recurring Indirect Total 
% of administrative 
budget 4% 9% 6% 18%
Cost estimates of MoG changes based on IfG cost model. Model based on interviews with senior civil servants, department annual reports 
and documentation of change, Civil Service Statistics and Select Committee Hearing Minutes. First year costs are tangible costs incurred in 
the first year of the department’s operations. Recurring costs refer to differential pay settlements which were agreed to in the first year of 
the department’s operations as a result of a merger. The settlement may be paid over several years. Increases to salaries as a result of the 
merger remain for the lifetime of the new organisation and therefore are coded as recurring although we do not attempt to predict how 
much these cost beyond the settlement payout. Indirect costs refer to productivity losses which we estimate for disruptive changes. 
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 The overall change cost of the creation of DEFRA totals £31m based on the documented costs 
and estimates after the first year post-merger alone. This total represents less than 1% of 
DEFRA’s total annual budget, but close to 18% of the department’s administrative budget for 
2001. 
Benefits of change 
While the costs of reorganisation tend to accrue in the short-term, and to be relatively easily 
measured or at least estimated with some difficulty, the benefits of successful reorganisations 
are more intangible and certainly accrue in the longer term. DEFRA successfully navigated 
through to the end of the foot-and-mouth crisis and the new department put in place 
revised procedures that have coped very successfully with agricultural health issues – so that 
subsequent scares or outbreaks have been quickly and effectively contained. The MAFF image 
of an agriculturally ‘captured’ department was also swiftly exorcised and the department has 
been broadly seen as maintaining a much better balance between agricultural productivity, 
food safety and environmental protection issues. 
More change? 
With the growing political salience of climate change, DEFRA became the lead department 
for an expanding area of concerns that only partly meshed with its predominantly rural- and 
countryside-focused approach to environmental issues. (Some Cabinet Office involvement 
in the climate change issue did little to resolve problems.) But it was not until mid 2009 that 
DEFRA was again restructured, losing the relatively small Office of Climate Change (that it 
had only recently created) to another Whitehall recombination move, the creation of DECC 
(see below). Some of our interviewees speculated about the long-term sustainability of DEFRA 
as it is currently structured, wondering whether the environment portfolio could reasonably 
stay with DEFRA in light of this new department. Most agreed that while DEFRA seems to be 
functioning effectively, ‘the boundaries can always change’ in the future. 
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 The Department for Work and Pensions
�
Context 
The creation of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) in 2001, also following the 
general election, stands out from the DEFRA case in several different dimensions. First, there 
was a strong administrative rationale for the move and the reorganisation was extensively 
planned in advance, with many different scenarios carefully considered. Second, it was driven 
through largely in response to a long-run governmental policy priority: the need to create 
stronger and more integrated active labour market policies, with political factors forming 
a fairly marginal set of side-notes to the central change process. This important difference 
reflected the huge size of DWP which despite extensive outsourcing of its IT functions 
accounted for nearly three of every 10 of all UK civil servants at its peak year in 2002. The 
operations of the welfare systems comprehensively integrated for the first time under DWP 
auspices also accounts for around a quarter or more of all public spending in the UK. 
The impetus of the reorganisation was to combat the long-standing separation of: 
•	� the social security system, coping with non-working people, both those of working age and 
pensioners, and run by the Department of Social Security 
•	� the employment advice and placement services and benefits for working-age people with 
qualifying employment records, run by the employment divisions of the Department for 
Education and Employment (DEE). 
Figure 24 shows the ‘family tree’ of DWP, with DSS formed in 1988 under the Conservative 
government as an integrated welfare-benefits ministry. The employment services for most of 
the post-war period were organised in a separate Ministry of Labour and then Department of 
Employment, but were shrunk under the Conservatives and linked with education in 1995. 
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Figure 24: The family tree for DWP 
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A clear rationale 
In 1997, Labour ministers came to office ambitious to introduce a different approach to 
managing unemployment and non-working for people of working age in a different way, 
stressing active labour market policies with stronger positive incentives and an administrative 
push to get non-working people into employment. Achieving an integrated set of policies across 
the DSS and DEE boundary line was essential for Blair’s goals of re-emphasising the mutuality 
of rights to benefit – the responsibilities for individuals themselves to actively seek work. The 
government’s ‘New Deal’ programmes for young unemployed people, lone parents, the long-
term unemployed, disabled and a host of others was integral to New Labour’s ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ agenda. Programmes sought to consolidate the ‘stricter’ Jobseekers Allowance 
(JSA) regime of the Conservatives with ‘guaranteed’ intensive employment assistance after a 
particular duration of unemployment.44 Following its 2001 election victory, the government 
also announced demanding new targets to increase employment rates (especially for lone 
parents and those in the most disadvantaged areas) and to reduce child poverty. 
Pilots and planning 
Yet there were two ways in which a Whitehall reorganisation might have accomplished this 
– either shifting all the benefits for working-age people over to the DEE to manage, leaving 
the DSS as a department solely for benefit to the elderly, ill and disabled; or shifting the 
employment divisions of DEE over to DSS control, the option that was finally adopted with 
the creation of DWP. Rather naturally perhaps, neither of the Secretaries of State involved was 
prepared to see their portfolio radically reduced, but the reorganisation could not be achieved 
without one or the other accepting a significant decline in salience. 
 The Whitehall solution was to begin an extensive trial of joint workings between the two 
departments at local level, which began in some areas of the country as the ‘One’ pilot in 1999 
and rapidly spread to more regions and localities. Supposedly a two-year experiment that would 
be systematically evaluated before a final decision, the One pilots were in fact quickly judged 
to be so successful that a decision to generalise them was made even before the 2001 general 
election, even as the choice between DEE and DWP was still being postponed by the Prime 
Minister. The One pilots were never formally evaluated (a fact that the relevant Parliamentary 
select committee deplored). But from 1999 onwards a Whitehall inter-departmental committee 
comprehensively examined the whys and wherefores of creating a single new department 
bringing together all benefits and advice services for working-age people in a service to be 
called JobCentre Plus that would break away from the old images of ‘labour exchanges’ and 
provide a radically improved standard of customer service. 
A small working party was set up to create a blue print for JobCentre Plus, chaired by the Chief 
Secretary of the Treasury and including senior leaders in the Department for Social Security 
and Department for Education and Employment. This investigation was also announced 
publicly, breaking with the usual conventions of keeping all reorganisation issues and discussions 
completely secret. The process was also backed up with detailed business planning for the 
merger and a raft of consultant reports on issues such as IT integration and achieving cultural 
change in whichever solution was adopted. The common wisdom amongst those officials to 
these discussions is that while open planning was theoretically ideal, the emotional charge 
of the process caused heightened stress and uncertainty for the respective departments and 
ministers. We heard several converging narratives of ghastly rows in Whitehall during this 
planning process and one individual who was aiding in the preparations frankly admitted that 
“it was quite the worst experience of my entire career”. 
Another interviewee explained that: 
It’s very difficult to have a detached conversation with people when their 
private interests are so involved. In a way, the right thing would have been 
to produce the blueprint but promise that it won’t happen until after the 
next election or reshuffle so that the politicians did not feel it would affect 
them personally.45 
In the end, shortly before the election, the recommendation which resulted from these 
discussions amongst officials was that the sponsoring department should be Education and 
Employment and not Social Security – a proposal that Blair put on hold until the re-shuffle that 
would follow the government’s return to office. 
Politics trumps in the end 
Much of the planning and piloting work was not affected in hugely significant ways by the 
eventual allocation of the top-level responsibility between the departments. But ironically 
after so much preparatory work and pre-planning, political considerations re-entered the 
picture and the Prime Minister decided not to follow the committee recommendation of 
allocating JobCentre Plus to DEE. Instead, as one insider explained: “It went the other way 
after the election, because of the need to give [a Cabinet colleague] what [they] wanted.” The 
employment services and the JobCentre Plus network were moved together with the benefits 
for working age people as one of three main components of a remodelled DSS, now called 
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 DWP – the other two components covering benefits for elderly people, and benefits for the 
sick and disabled. The new department had over 122,000 direct employees and the staff in the 
department headquarters expanded from just over 3,400 under DSS to 5,400 under DWP, as 
Figure 25 shows.46 
The change process 
Because of the prep work that had already been carried out, the issues involved in the 
reorganisation were well known from the outset. The top officials were also given ten days 
notice of the Prime Minister’s decision being announced and so had more time than in the 
creation of DEFRA to prepare for the public launch of the new ministry. 
Figure 25: Quick facts on DWP’s creation 
Planning prior to announcement 
Number of days to prepare prior to live  > 10 days 
FTE Count – old 3,140 
FTE Count – new 5,430 
Scale of change (% FTEs) 84% 
Scope of change 
Settling­in time 6­9 months 
Time to integration > 2 years 
Black shaded circles are relative measures compared to other case studies based on the researchers comparative analysis. Number of days 
to prepare prior to live indicates the number of days the transition teams were given to prepare the department prior to it being open for 
business. Settling-in time refers to the amount of time required before the Department was able to begin to act on its mandate. Time to 
integration refers to the amount of time required before the changed Department functioned as a whole. All responses based on interviews 
with senior civil servants. 
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 Challenges in modernising the new department 
Despite the ‘One’ experiments, the organisational cultures of the DSS and DEE were still very 
different at the time of the merger, the main department focusing on the accurate and prompt 
payment of social security benefits, while the employment divisions had previously focused 
mainly on achieving a marriage between education and employment in a skills agenda for 
long-term economic prosperity. inheritance of chronic 
under-investment in buildings and computer systems under the Conservative governments 
before 1997, which took many years of investment and strong modernisation efforts to begin 
to counteract. As with a similarly scaled corporate merger, the new department also faced 
significant organisational upheaval in its early years. Figure 26 shows the productivity losses 
estimated by the Office for National Statistics and the DWP itself during this time period.47 
A number of interconnecting issues were at play during this time which affected productivity: 
modernisation had to be paid for by realising synergies and cutting out jobs and services that 
duplicated each other, which met with some strikes and industrial action; management turnover 
was considerable in the early years, with policy consistency hindered by the rapid rotation of 
ministers in both the Secretary of State and junior ministerial roles; and a period of relative 
economic prosperity coupled with a relatively inflexible labour force which left some staff with 
time on their hands. Taken together, these pressures (many of which were a direct result of the 
organisational change), affected productivity negatively for a number of years post-merger. 
Figure 26: Productivity dips experienced by DWP 
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The DWP preferred measure of productivity is based on recurrent expenditure and quality adjusted output. The ONS uses a technical view 
of productivity based on the Atkinson Report defined as the volume of goods and services produced by an organisation for its customers 
from a given input volume. Both of these measures, in general, imply that productivity decreased during a period of massive organisational 
change. For a discussion of both methods see the DWP Spear Research Summary (2006): An analysis of DWP productivity. 
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 The costs of change 
Given the size of DWP, it was inevitable that the reorganisation process was appreciably more 
costly than any of the other cases considered here. We use the same approach for costing the 
creation of DWP as we did above for DEFRA. 
First-year costs: The immediate costs of the creation of DWP were very similar to those for 
DEFRA at approximately £9m (Figure 27). Of these, IT and systems costs proved to be the 
greatest percentage. 
Recurring costs: The onset of industrial action and pay differential problems also emerged 
as significant for DWP. Despite DSS and DEE being much more similar in starting positions 
than was the case in DEFRA, the 2002 settlement reached approximately £140m.48 As we 
noted in the DEFRA case, the net cost of the pay increases at DWP would have been far 
greater than the original settlement over the future lifetime of the department the delta in 
additional salary increases could be quantified as a machinery of government change cost. 
Indirect costs: The considerable disruption which resulted from the change at DWP leads 
us to believe productivity dips are worth estimating. Once again, our estimate of total 
productivity loss using standard costings and scaling them for the with-agency FTE counts 
amounts to over £24m. Again, we feel this is a conservative measure of the disruption that 
occurred to this department only using 20% disruption to 20% (a 4% loss overall) of staff and 
quantifying salary level loss only.49 
Thus our overall estimate of the costs of reorganisation in DWP’s case is around seven times 
larger than those for DEFRA, but are broadly comparable once scope and size issues are 
controlled for. 
Benefits of change 
In terms of the benefits of changes, there seems little doubt that the gains made from the 
reorganisation have far exceeded the costs involved. Amongst all the department changes which 
occurred between 1979 and 2009, DWP was rated the most successful department change by 
our interviewees, with none of the respondents viewing the department as problematic in any 
way (see Figure 20 above). The department has remained unchanged in the intervening years 
(although its component agencies were subsequently reduced from three to two by an internal 
merger that created the Pensions, Disability and Carers Service (PDCS) in 2005. 
The ‘look and feel’ of DWP’s buildings, especially JobCentre Plus, services and communications 
with customers have all improved appreciably since 2001, while its IT systems and related 
business processes have also clearly strengthened in an era where government IT, as a whole, 
has faced considerable difficulties. The department is also expected to endure unchanged 
throughout at least the next administration, whatever its political colour. The reasons behind 
these glowing views stem largely from the perceived logic of the merger of the work and 
benefits function, not only linking unemployment benefits to job-seeking services, but linking 
both with the pension service as well. Interviewees commented: 
58  3. UK case studies 
 Figure 27: Estimated costs of DWP as known at June 2002 
£24,100,000 £173,374,300 
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HR systems integration 
IT investment 
IT Integration 
Productivity 
£140,000,000 
£173,374,300 
£24,100,000 
£140,000,000 
£9,274,3000 
£3,300,000 
First year Recurring Indirect Total 
Differential pay settlement 
% of administrative 
budget 
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Cost estimates of MoG changes based on IfG Cost Model. Model based on interviews with senior civil servants, department annual reports 
and documentation of change, Civil Service Statistics and Select Committee Hearing Minutes. First year costs are tangible costs incurred in 
the first year of the department’s operations. Recurring costs refer to differential pay settlements which were agreed to in the first year of 
the department’s operations as a result of a merger. The settlement may be paid over several years. Increases to salaries as a result of the 
merger remain for the lifetime of the new organisation and therefore are coded as recurring although we do not attempt to predict how 
much these cost beyond the settlement payout. Indirect costs refer to productivity losses which we estimate for disruptive changes. 
Probably the most successful [reorganisation] in my view was DWP. It’s 
hard to remember now that it didn’t exist. There’s a real logic in bringing 
work and benefits together in that way. It’s a compelling logic.50 
DWP… has been very successful. It has three client groups with one thing 
that unites them which is the world of work. What’s the best way to get a 
bad pension? The answer is not to work long enough. So that [change has] 
been quite successful.51 
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 The Department for Children, Schools 
and Families and the Department for 
Innovation, Universities and Skills 
Context 
Gordon Brown’s first Whitehall changes as Prime Minister in June 2007 created the Department 
for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) to deal with all aspects of the education and care of 
children up to 16 years of age. This move was a radical break with the 59 year-old pattern of 
having an education ministry that covered all aspects of the education system from nurseries 
through schools and colleges to universities and research in one department (see Figure 28). For 
most of the post-1970 period the education ministry also had control of the science research 
budget, and was called the Department for Education and Science (DES). 
However, under John Major this role was moved to the main business department (then the 
Department for Trade and Industry). Instead the Conservatives sought to link education with 
a skills agenda by putting it in the Department for Education and Employment. This ministry, 
DEE, was scrapped after six years at the time of the creation of DWP. Also in 2002, a new 
version of DES was created – DES – this time standing for Department of Education and Skills, 
since the department retained responsibility for the training of (mainly young) people in 
vocational skills directly for the world of work. All these were essentially permutations of the 
idea of an integrated education ministry, which throughout remained the ‘genetic code’ of the 
department. 
A new type of department structure 
By contrast, DCSF no longer had any roles in research, further or higher education, but instead 
brought together nurseries and schools along with children’s social services, especially child-
care provision and child protection. A key motivation here was that a number of serious 
and damaging scandals occurred during the new Labour government, where young children 
of different ages were killed by their parents or other carers and the different branches of 
childrens’ services – schools and social services, plus the NHS and police – failed to co-ordinate 
their activities to prevent disasters. In the noughties, many local authorities had already moved 
to bring their schools, child care and child protection services under a single directorate, and so 
the creation of DCSF in some ways gave belated recognition to this trend towards this more 
client-focused approach, encapsulated in the ‘Every Child Matters’ drive to integrate services in 
‘Children’s Trusts’ at a local level from 2005. Politically the move also created a major cabinet 
role for Ed Balls, long one of Brown’s closest advisors and most important supporters. 
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 Figure 28: Family tree of DIUS and DCSF 
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Once DCSF was envisaged as exclusively children-focused, then the remaining education 
roles of providing vocational skills services for post-16 young people and running higher 
education policy and funding either had to be given to a new department or moved elsewhere 
in Whitehall. The only alternative billet was to place these services under the control of 
the government’s main business department, the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) 
– which already supervised the highly expensive government support for the science and 
technology research base. Instead Brown opted for the new department solution by creating 
the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) and transferring the science 
research support role to it from DTI (itself renamed as the Department for Business, Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reduction, BERR). DIUS was given a strong ‘innovation’ and productivity focus 
to ‘provide a strong, integrated, permanent voice across Government for effective investment 
in research, science, enterprise and skills, embedding these into the heart of the government’s 
competitiveness strategy’. This idea reflected two themes of Brown’s long tenure as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer by marrying universities more closely to the economy in hopes of generating 
greater commercialization of research and innovation in the higher education sector and 
combating the UK’s long-standing skills and productivity deficiencies. Politically the move also 
created a space for Brown to bring back John Denham into Cabinet, who had resigned as a 
minister in 2003 in opposition to the invasion of Iraq. 
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 The change process 
In terms of implementation, the senior civil servants at Education (and DTI because they were 
losing functions) were briefed on the forthcoming changes ten days in advance of the Prime 
Minister’s announcement, so that the remaining DES hierarchy was able to plan ahead to absorb 
the non-education children services, and to shed the skills and universities role. By contrast, the 
creation of DIUS was more rushed because a brand new departmental centre had to be built 
from scratch and initially identifying a suitable person to become the new Permanent Secretary 
staff was difficult. 
One person close to the change explained that the Cabinet Secretary worked in conjunction 
with the other pertinent civil servants for five days to identify a leader for DIUS “because there 
were two exporters to talk to… and there was no importer. It was only at the very end of that 
week that he thought of Ian Watmore”. By the time that this problem was solved the DIUS 
senior staff had only three days to prepare. Thus while both departments were announced 
simultaneously along with the creation of BERR, the DCSF had relatively more planning time 
than DIUS. Figure 29 shows the key facts about the new departments. 
Once briefed, however, the reorganisation process for both departments was again the 
traditional one of maintaining complete secrecy about forthcoming changes until the respective 
Secretary of States were made aware of the change by the PM once the reshuffle was 
imminent. For DCSF this meant discussing the change and its implications with staff at the 
Treasury, who were seen in Education as the primary architects of this particular departmental 
reconfiguration. For a week, the DES Management Board operated in secret to put together 
plans and prepare for the change: 
[X] called the Board together on the Monday morning and suggested that 
as a Board we do all the thinking and planning. Then, for the following 
week, we did all the planning and thinking in that very small group. 
Relative ease for the demerger DCSF was able to create an eight-person transition team 
in advance of the announcement and bring them together to work with the Board in the 
final days before the announcement. The rest of the organisation, however, was not privy 
to any details until the actual announcement by the PM. From the civil service’s point of 
view – at least those directly involved in running the process – the effort was successful: 
“It was a brilliant piece of work from the people involved and I think the civil service takes 
an enormous amount of credit for putting that together under such bizarre circumstances”. 
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 Figure 29: Quick facts on the creation of DCSF and DIUS 
DIUS DCSF 
Planning prior to announcement  Planning prior to announcement 
Number of days to prepare prior to live  3 Number of days to prepare prior to live  10 
FTE Count – old*  650 FTE Count – old*  4,060 
FTE Count – new  809 FTE Count – new  3,910 
Scale of change (% FTEs) 
Scope of change 
+20% Scale of change (% FTEs) 
Scope of change 
–17% 
Settling­in time  10 months Settling­in time  <6 months 
Time to integration  NA Time to integration  <6 months 
*Estimate 80% of staff from DfES. Black shaded circles are relative measures compared to other case studies based on the researchers 
comparative analysis. Number of days to prepare prior to live indicates the number of days the transition teams were given to prepare the 
department prior to it being open for business. Settling-in time refers to the amount of time required before the department was able to 
begin to act on its mandate. Time to integration refers to the amount of time required before the changed department functioned as a 
whole. All responses based on interviews with senior civil servants. 
The stark difficulties of creating a new department DIUS had a considerably more 
chaotic planning process once its top civil servant was chosen and in place alongside a 
‘scratch’ team for the new departmental centre. Although a merger of already ongoing 
operations, and as Figure 29 shows one of the smallest Whitehall departments, DIUS still 
needed to get a complete set of ministers in post, equip them with private offices, create 
a new press office from scratch, find a physical building to serve as its headquarters and 
put in place other essential aspects of a new corporate centre, including HQ financial and 
IT staffs. The team also had to create a new brand and website and to flesh out the very 
minimal brief from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office as a developed rationale and 
organisational mission. The Secretary of State, Permanent Secretary and a small transitional 
team of four were put in place over a weekend, in their hands only a two-page brief from the 
Prime Minister which they had to transform into a department. These initial challenges had 
something of a lasting impact on DIUS because the department was always running to keep 
up with the expectations of its numerous and vocal stakeholders and of the media. 
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 As with DEFRA seven years earlier, the DIUS planning team were shocked to find that little 
support was available from the centre of government and that basic guidelines on creating a 
new department were lacking: 
We were quite surprised how little institutional memory there was around 
machinery of government. I was quite shocked by that. And a number of 
the questions we had, we solved ourselves because no one at the centre 
knew. We felt like we were working in the dark.52 
Diseconomies of scale DIUS did not fare well in the negotiations process with DCSF and 
BERR about the transfers of budgets to go alongside its new responsibilities. As we have seen 
above, as HMT generally deems MoG changes cost-neutral, any new department’s additional 
requirements for management, accommodation and other functions come with no funding 
attached. Indeed, an interviewee at DCSF said of the change: 
The costs [of reorganisation] were more observable on the DIUS end. I don’t 
know if we ever did the exercise [to cost DCSF changes]. I suspect that the 
actual costs for this department were quite modest. You might say a couple 
of weeks work on the administration and signs changed and stationary. 
And the other costs on corporate services were tied up with decoupling who 
our staff were and who the DIUS staff were. But of course, the Treasury says 
they [reorganisations] are cost neutral. How could it possibly be cost neutral? 
It’s just completely barking mad. For DIUS, you had the overhead and 
infrastructure of an organisation. And you couldn’t just say DIUS was 50% 
of what the DES was and DES could restructure its costs downward by 50%. 
The first months at DIUS were dedicated to building the core of the organisation: ensuring 
that existing operations flowed smoothly; and that the department was able to deliver on 
its current commitments. It was not until April 2008 that staff from the various source 
departments were brought under one roof, almost 10 months after the announcement of 
DIUS’s creation. Despite the best hopes of the department’s e-savvy Permanent Secretary, 
e-communications and a departmental intranet could not compensate for the physical 
separation of DIUS’s component sections. As a result the hopes of achieving synergies across 
the department’s separate functional areas were pushed further down track. 
Costs of DIUS 
First-year costs: Even though DIUS total staff numbers were quite small at only 809 FTEs 
at the time of its creation, we estimate that the costs of its creation were close to £15m. 
The details of this estimate are shown in Figure 30 below. The biggest cost incurred for DIUS 
was largely with respect to new accommodation, which we estimate at £10m based on 
interviews and accommodation estimates from other departments. Achieving IT integration 
across the department’s silos and different financial control systems was also substantially 
costly, at around £3m. 
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 Indirect costs: Maintaining the same approach applied in the earlier costing estimates, we 
apply a 20% disruption to 20% (a 4% loss overall) of staff to estimate a productivity dip 
associated with this relatively large-scale organisational change – quantifying salary level 
loss only.53 
Note that we do not estimate recurring costs from pay harmonisation for the creation of DIUS. 
The new department was not subject to labour disputes and consequently, data was not readily 
available to us to estimate pay harmonisation costs. 
Our overall estimate is in line with figures quoted in our interviews on the cost of DIUS and with 
the former permanent secretary’s already publicised estimate of its costs of creation at £13-15m 
in the first year. One official from another department close to the change told us that: 
When DIUS was set up, we had to go to arbitration with the Treasury, 
same as when DECC was set up. However grown up you tried to make the 
conversations…  We gave more than we felt was objectively justified and 
that came to about £9m or £10m above and beyond transferring the costs 
associated with the staff and Ian [Watmore, the Permanent Secretary at 
DIUS] reckoned he was about £10m light. And I suspect the same is true 
in DECC’s case because of the diseconomies of scale of having a finance 
department, communications and all the overheads. I think there is a case 
for some guidelines. But the bottom line is there will be diseconomies of 
scale and the Treasury is bound to say there’s no new money. 
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 Figure 30: The costs of creating DIUS 
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Cost estimates of MoG Changes based on IfG Cost Model. Model based on interviews with senior civil servants, Department annual reports 
and documentation of change, Civil Service Statistics and Select Committee Hearing Minutes. First year costs are tangible costs incurred in 
the first year of the Department’s operations. Recurring costs refer to differential pay settlements which were agreed to in the first year of 
the Department’s operations as a result of a merger. The settlement may be paid over several years. Increases to salaries as a result of the 
merger remain for the lifetime of the new organisation and therefore are coded as recurring although we do not attempt to predict how 
much these cost beyond the settlement payout. Indirect costs refer to productivity losses which we estimate for disruptive changes. 
Adjustment challenges and missteps early on: Modest changes were beginning to occur 
at the department after the first anniversary of its creation. A cross-departmental group 
was established to identify synergies and ways for the four silos (further education, higher 
education, science and research, and innovation) to work better together. Most of DIUS 
employees remained on their pre-existing pay scales and contractual terms and conditions 
of employment throughout the ultimately short lifetime of the department.54 Progress on 
integration, however, was slow and frustration among staff was reported regarding the 
challenges of shared services and processes in the capability reviews.55 There were also a 
considerable number of serious glitches in the public financing schemes that the department 
was responsible for supervising. The further education capital funding programme ‘Building 
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 Colleges for the Future’ specifically was deemed a disaster badly managed by both the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) and the Learning and Skills Council 
(LSC) by a report from the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee.56 Halfway 
through the programme, the report claims, it suddenly dawned on the senior management 
of DIUS and the LSC that the total potential cost of projects which had received ‘approval in 
principle’ were more than the total capital budget and many more applications were in the 
pipeline. Rather than try to dampen demand, the committee concludes that the LSC was 
building up a bidding culture amongst colleges. 
In the higher education area there were no similar disasters, partly thanks to generous 
financial settlements from the Treasury in these years. But under Education the universities 
had been used to avoiding financial pressures at the year end, because the schools sector 
habitually under-spent its budgets, so that the department as a whole was often not 
under tight financial constraint and a degree of overspend in universities could be easily 
accommodated. Now that this almost automatic comfort blanket was no longer present, 
keeping spending within limits raised new difficulties for the university sector. 
Perhaps most telling of all, a long-delayed DIUS strategy document providing guidelines 
on how the department would function moving forward, was actually only finalised in 
April 2009. Just two months later at a major reshuffle Brown decided to move Denham to 
another ministry and to wind up DIUS as a separate department, transferring its functions 
to the new ‘super-department’ of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), created with the 
powerful Peter Mandelson at the helm. 
DCSF: Catching up with the local authorities 
In sharp contrast with DIUS, the DCSF experience was relatively smooth. Civil servants there 
found that the creation of the department resonated with its staff, local authorities and other 
stakeholders: 
For quite a lot of people in the department at DCSF, they felt there was a 
great logic in what we were doing and the change was institutionalising in 
the structures of the department what it was that people felt we were trying 
to achieve… There was a logic in creating it. 
The creation of DCSF resonated with large parts of the local authority professional world as 
well. For senior civil servants at the department the message was that “You had required that 
we create directors of children’s services in 2005. We [children’s services] got ahead of you and 
now you’re catching up with us”. This deeper-lying fit with wider trends in the sector meshed 
with the stronger continuity in DCSF’s core schools roles: 
We had the easier bit of the split because 70 per cent of the DCSF was 
continuing in staff terms from the DES. DIUS was the new entity. We 
felt like continuing but expanding. We had the building… we felt like 
continuity plus. We had a particular SoS who had the headroom to make 
a big splash quickly and very much drove what he wanted to drive in the 
department.57 
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 Few costs for children’s services Turning to the costs of the changes, interviewees told us 
that few costs were incurred at the DCSF and that the change itself was not very disruptive 
compared to what DIUS was struggling with. DCSF staff were also quite positive regarding 
costs, delivery risk and disruption: 
We were able to use the opportunity of the creation of a brand new 
department to get people behind the mission of the department. It was an 
opportunity to accelerate organisational change that was already there. 
I don’t think we missed a beat as the departments changed. I think we were 
very fortunate that we didn’t lose momentum and I think that comes back 
to the logic of the department and the energy of the Secretary of State.58 
Reflecting on their ability to achieve change, DCSF officials felt that strong organisation 
allowed them to progress forwards whereas DIUS was constrained by limited resources and 
a larger scope of change: 
We didn’t get side-tracked by the administrative bits. It was delegated to 
the Director of Corporate Services and the PS [permanent secretary] and 
Board did not get sucked into the administration of the change. That 
relies on having someone you can completely trust to deliver. I think that 
for DIUS they were very thin in being able to accomplish that and Ian 
[Watmore] found himself having to deliver the policy and do this massive 
organisational change. DCSF was able to avoid that partly because of the 
individuals here but partly because of the super structure we had.59 
Benefits of the change 
Turning to the benefits of the two reorganisations, the fact that DIUS did not endure beyond 
two years as a separate entity means that it did not have time to achieve the full promise of 
its 2007 brief, while its reputation was tarnished by the succession of funding policy mishaps. 
Nonetheless, the department did achieve an interesting change of tone in discussions about 
the importance and role of innovation in sustaining the UK’s economic flourishing. To give one 
example, some felt that in all its many years of supposedly handling the ‘innovation’ brief, the 
DTI retained a solely private sector and very dated ‘metal-bashing’ conception of industry, even 
though the UK public sector accounts for a quarter of all final consumption in the economy and 
is clearly critically important in many dimensions for national productivity. DIUS transformed 
this stance in its two years, initiating work on productivity and innovation in the public services 
that had never been contemplated before. Indeed, one of its quangos (NESTA) also raised 
challenges about ‘hidden innovation’ that does not show up in the old industrial focus on 
patents (as with innovations in financial services). Some also felt the shift helped make the HE 
and FE sectors focus much more on the relation to the wider economy, and away from a more 
traditional ‘education’ brief. The bulk transfer of the DIUS functions to Business, Innovation 
and Skills ensured that the impact of many of these positive initiatives under DIUS transferred 
across, at least for a while. 
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 Whether DCSF will survive in its current form has also been much discussed, following 
commentary by prominent Conservatives ,including David Cameron and Francis Maude 
in November 2009, that the new business department (BIS) is too large and an integrated 
Education department could be considered should the Conservatives come to power at the 
2010 general election. Officials within DCSF commented that a reversion to an education 
department was plausible and potentially politically salient: “Symbolically, calling it a 
Department of Education is a big symbolic act. As symbolic as it was for [Gordon] Brown and 
[Ed] Balls to call this the ‘Department for Children’.” Officials felt that a return to the pre 2007 
format would be easily accepted by staff in the Department, should it occur, because it would 
not erase the solid gains which have already been made in focusing on children. “The structures 
of government are important politically”, one interviewee said, “but we overestimate how 
important they are in bringing about change and delivery”. 
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 Department for Energy and Climate 
Change 
Context 
The Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) was created in October 2008 by 
merging the energy divisions of BERR with the Office for Climate Change from DEFRA, so 
as to ‘bring together energy and climate change policy to respond to the challenges faced in 
working towards de-carbonising the economy and ensuring energy security’.60 The change 
was part of a larger government reshuffle which involved important political negotiations with 
respect to cabinet ministers and saw the return to government of Lord Mandelson, who later 
became Secretary of State for a greatly enlarged and renamed Business, Innovation and Skills 
department, despite losing a few hundred staff and the energy brief (see above). The new DECC 
Secretary of State, Ed Miliband was also a strong Brown loyalist who had served with him at 
the Treasury for many years. 
Figure 31: The creation of DECC 
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As Figure 31 shows, the decision ended a 16-year period from 1992 when the last remnant 
of Labour’s 1970s Department of Energy was abolished by Margaret Thatcher, following on 
from the privatisation of the formerly extensive BP oil shares holding, the British North Sea Oil 
Corporation (BNOC), British Gas and the state-owned electricity companies. The organisational 
‘death’ of Energy as a separate department was an unusual event, made possible by the 
retirement of a third of its senior staff, moves into various regulatory bodies by a further third, 
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 and the transfer of the last third into DTI. In the benign, low-cost energy environment of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, entrusting the UK’s energy futures largely to a junior DTI minister 
was satisfactory. But as this era began to come to an end in the mid noughties, with the UK 
switching from being a net exporter to an importer of energy as the North Sea supplies began 
to run low, and security concerns emerged about future energy supplies, stakeholder demands 
for the recreation of a separate energy department began to grow. 
A second long-run change in the policy concerns of British government grew rapidly from 2002 
onwards with the escalating significance of climate change, and especially its management via 
a series of international agreements trading off economic decisions about energy sources with 
commitments to take action safeguarding the earth against continuously rising temperatures 
as a result of industrial and domestic carbon emissions. This very different new angle on 
environmental issues prompted DEFRA to establish the Office of Climate Change in 2006 
but the weight of the department’s environmental slant remained very much on the natural 
environment, and it relied on the DTI to negotiate and deliver business acceptance of climate 
change and sustainability concerns – all issues which fitted poorly with its overtly pro-business 
orientation. 
A clear rationale 
Throughout the four years leading up to DECC’s creation there is evidence that the Cabinet 
Office advised the Prime Minister on and off about the interlinked issues of energy and  
climate change/sustainability and possible departmental reorganisations to be more effectively 
co-ordinated: 
It looked plausible publicly and pleased the greens. We had looked at it for 
years as a private piece of work for the PM. The conclusion was that there 
could be one substantial advantage that you had in the energy part of DTI 
a group good at CBA and economic analysis – and the climate change bit 
was very bad at those things. And it was actually because of that, that it [a 
new department] had failed to cut any ice at all with the Treasury.61 
Politics served as the tipping point 
Eventually, the political salience of both signalling the importance of climate change to voters 
and the international community in advance of the Copenhagen Conference of December 
2009, as well as signaling to the electorate that the government was gripping the increasingly 
media-focused UK energy supply crisis, began to outweigh the earlier obstacles to creating the 
Department. The final tipping point for a new department was Brown’s simultaneous political 
need to offset somewhat moving the whole DIUS portfolio over to Mandelson, while also 
finding a Cabinet position for Ed Miliband. This combination of factors tipped the argument in 
favour of creating the [currently] smallest and newest government department, one that  
Figure 32 shows was created with just 1,000 civil servants. 
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 Figure 32: Quick facts on DECC’s creation 
Planning prior to announcement 
Number of days to prepare prior to live  1 night 
FTE Count – old  650 
FTE Count – new 
Scale of change (% FTEs) 
1,000 
35% 
Scope of change 
Settling­in time  6­9 months 
Time to integration  > 2 years* 
*Estimate by Senior Civil Servant, DECC 
Black shaded circles are relative measures compared to other case studies based on the researchers comparative analysis. Number of days 
to prepare prior to live indicates the number of days the transition teams were given to prepare the department prior to it being open for 
business. Settling-in time refers to the amount of time required before the department was able to begin to act on its mandate. Time to 
integration refers to the amount of time required before the changed department functioned as a whole. All responses based on interviews 
with senior civil servants. 
The change process 
No planning: Unfortunately for the Secretary of State and senior civil servants who were 
to create DECC and bring its functions together into one department, the earlier discussions 
did not translate into any planning phase with time for preparation. The new teams at BIS, 
DEFRA and DECC-to-be were briefed just one day before the announcement of the new 
department and given just one night of preparatory time to get the DECC publicly ready for 
business. One closely-affected senior civil servant was out of the country at the time and 
discussed the implications of the changing configuration by phone. 
Unsurprisingly then, whilst it was formally operational, DECC was not in fact fully prepared 
for business in its first days. Instead conditions were again somewhat chaotic and embattled: 
They had no IT… The first few weeks were really difficult because all the staff 
were in the wrong place. The ministers were in one [different] building… it 
was a bit like going back to WWII. There were messengers coming in with 
bits of paper because they didn’t have IT connected and so on.62 
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 Like DIUS then, DECC started running to catch up – an unfavourable context to be in. 
Interviews with people close to the transition have suggested that the department’s first six 
to nine months were dominated by set-up concerns, finding pathways and time to function 
operationally and get everyone under one roof. Insiders told us that the change took its toll 
on several key staff, who even after a year felt exhausted – while there is at least anecdotal 
evidence that some top talent left the new organisation: 
You have the worst possible world when there’s no receiving department. 
In the case of DECC there was nothing, no building, no one in place, not 
even a name plate to put on the door. It hasn’t gotten over this even now. 
The shakeout is still happening. People are still leaving. Almost all the key 
figures that were drafted from other departments have chosen to leave.63 
No support but DIUS helps DECC: Again a lack of central planning and support functions 
from the Cabinet Office and Treasury made this difficult situation worse. 
The Cabinet Office supplied a document of best practices to follow during machinery of 
government changes, which, whilst helpful in documenting all of the items which should 
be planned for, was not realistic given the context within which actual department changes 
occur. Preparation lead times, for example, were assumed to be at least four weeks. Where 
DECC did gain support, however, was from leaders of other departments which had been 
created under similar circumstances in the recent past – a curious positive aspect of 
increased rates of MoG change. The Department’s transition team found the team at DIUS 
to be particularly helpful since it too involved the creation of a brand new department. 
Costs of the new department 
Turning to the costs of the reorganisation, despite DECC’s small size – as with DIUS – creating a 
new department produced costs of at least £15m, shown in more detail in Figure 33. 
First-year costs: The new corporate centre required suitable accommodation, at a cost 
around £10m in the first year, and again IT integration to unify across the ex-DTI systems 
and the former DEFRA systems cost approximately £3m. 
Indirect costs: Achieving a common organisational culture across the two radically 
different halves of the department was far from straightforward. Some interviewees told us 
that an instruction from the Secretary of State that all business cards should be printed with 
the slogan ‘Committed to sustainability’ produced a near revolt amongst former DTI staff, 
who argued that their credibility with hard-headed business stakeholders would sink to zero. 
By the end of the first year, whilst productivity was generally seen to have been stable or 
more positive, the consensus amongst those close to the transition was that the staff were 
exhausted and the pace of change of the past year was not sustainable for much longer. We 
use the same approach applied in the earlier costing estimates of a 20% disruption to 20% 
(a 4% loss overall) of staff to estimate a productivity dip associated with this organisational 
change – quantifying salary level loss only.64 
Note that again, we do not estimate recurring costs from pay harmonisation for the creation 
of DIUS. The new department was not subject to labour disputes and consequently, data 
was not readily available to us to estimate pay harmonisation costs. 
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 Figure 33: The costs of setting up DECC 
First year Recurring Indirect Total 
£13,987,500 0 
£1,700,000 £15,687,500 
£15,687,500 
£1,700,000 
0 
£10,000,000 
£3,000,000 
£167,000 
Accommodation 
HR systems integration 
IT investment 
IT Integration 
Differential pay settlement 
Productivity 
% of administrative 
budget 
18% 0% 2% 20% 
Cost estimates of MoG changes based on IfG Cost Model. Model based on interviews with senior civil servants, Department annual reports 
and documentation of change, Civil Service Statistics and Select Committee Hearing Minutes. First year costs are tangible costs incurred in 
the first year of the Department’s operations. Recurring costs refer to differential pay settlements which were agreed to in the first year of 
the Department’s operations as a result of a merger. The settlement may be paid over several years. Increases to salaries as a result of the 
merger remain for the lifetime of the new organisation and therefore are coded as recurring although we do not attempt to predict how 
much these cost beyond the settlement payout. Indirect costs refer to productivity losses which we estimate for disruptive changes. 
Possibly more change? 
Amongst our group of interviewees, DECC is generally perceived to be a department that 
has successfully introduced greater political priority for energy and climate change concerns, 
and successfully internalised some of the previously marked inter-departmental differences 
in approach. Yet whether the department will endure in its current form remains doubtful. 
The boundary issue which exists with the environment part of DEFRA was regularly discussed 
as being potentially problematic over the long-term. Moreover, some interviewees were not 
convinced that the operational merger was necessary to achieve the intended synergies 
between energy and climate change: 
Putting energy and climate change together, maybe you’ll get more effective 
work in there than you’ve had in the past but was it really necessary? That 
was really a policy problem that you were resolving. Not that the climate 
change people have business process that automatically involved the 
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 operation of energy companies. That was trying to resolve a problem at the 
level of policy and politics... And a machinery of government change as an 
instrument of policy seems to me to be a bad idea.65 
A more poignant concern lies with internalising the debate between energy and climate change 
in one department. Interviewees generally felt that whether or not the department succeeds 
will now rest largely on the skills of the Permanent Secretary and Secretary of State. The 
debate no longer reaches across departmental boundaries: 
The downside is... that when you have two areas of policy which are so 
much in conflict, it’s much better to externalise the argument than to 
internalise it... And that’s exactly what has happened [with DECC]. Nobody 
else gets a look in.66 
Another interviewee explained that the risk of failure at DECC is further heightened because the 
debate is between two conflicting factors: 
There is a debate between the requirement to produce energy as cheaply as 
possible – at least in the true resource sense. The other is to want to make 
statements in global leadership on environmental issues. Instead of nuclear 
energy and renewables competing [where] there would be a problem 
resolution, one of those partners tends to get suppressed. And I think that’s 
what’s happened with nuclear power. You’re better off having the dispute 
resolution set at the level above – at cabinet level.67 
In addition to DECC continuing as it is, two or three different possible future scenarios exist. In 
one, DECC might expand its control of environmental concerns at DEFRA’S expense. In another, 
the energy function might be reallocated to BIS once again. Possibly both changes might occur 
at once. 
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 4: A deeper case for MoG changes?
�
In considering department reconfigurations, it is useful to take a step back and compare the 
reorganisation issues in government with those elsewhere, asking whether government is 
perhaps now a rather unusual area in the digital era in still trying to solve its organisational 
challenges through structural change. 
We briefly compare government reorganisations with corporate structures and with mergers 
and acquisitions in the private sector. A key question raised by this analysis is – instead of 
searching for a single ‘perfect’ structure, for instance, should government be aiming to construct 
more ‘agile’ ways of organising? Instead of minimising changes because of their costs and 
disruptive effects, should Whitehall be aiming to create a set-up where change can happen 
more easily and seamlessly, and where the costs of changes (recognised as likely to continue 
to occur) are instead minimised and measures put in place to allow smoother reorganisations 
where needed? 
In this final section we consider the possibilities for creating more agile structures in  
Whitehall – and, in a sense – making departmental boundaries and loyalties matter less than 
they do at present. 
Is top government in fact strangely stable? 
Writing in 1976, before the tremendous shake-up of governments inaugurated by Thatcher, 
Reagan and the ‘new public management’ movement, the American political scientist Herbert 
Kaufman asked a question that is highly relevant for Whitehall: Are government organisations 
immortal? His point was that once a salient function is taken on by the state, it is rarely let go 
or superceded. The ‘products’ of state intervention tend to create political support from interest 
groups and stakeholders, while the more successful they are in building this constituency the 
more powerful they tend to become within the state apparatus itself. 
In particular, successful public policy programmes tend to insulate their organisation from 
change, and even if their original rationale weakens they can typically find new analogous 
missions (thus horse cavalry become armoured divisions, and the US airforce’s current strategic 
plan calls for it to migrate to being a ‘spaceforce’ in the future). 
The implication then becomes that once they are set up government organisations rarely, if 
ever, ‘die.’ This is in contrast to many private sector firms where new ‘births’, the growth of 
small competitors and ceaseless technological and market innovations constantly put pressure 
on big companies. As such, the dominant companies of the 1960s look nothing like those of 
the 2000s. 
By contrast, the lineage of Whitehall organisations is not hard to trace and the main movement 
has been a proliferation of branches on the organisational tree from the nineteenth century to 
the 1950s, followed by a slight pruning back since then. The family trees of departments have 
morphed and intertwined through successive reorganisations but no major department has 
completely died out. 
Limited pressure to innovate 
Does this matter? It may, in one important way – there cannot be a strictly evolutionary 
organisation process in government. One branch of organisational studies, called organisational 
ecology, points out that in the most competitive sectors of the private economy, much 
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 innovation takes the form of new firms displacing old firms, without any ‘organisational 
learning’ occurring. For instance, in the restaurant sector thousands of new entrants come into 
the market each year with different rationales, menus and customer audiences, while a tranche 
of existing companies go out of business. 
Change is thus a competitive succession process, and not a direct learning process – once 
established in one niche a restaurant will rarely change its character significantly – but merely 
flourish or die out. By contrast in Whitehall, there is little succession. There may be marginal 
competition between agencies to ‘own’ particular new ‘turfs’ that open up, but the general 
ethos of state organisation is the avoidance of ‘duplication’ – so that only one department 
or agency should be handling any one function at a time. British government interprets this 
very strictly, unlike (say) US federal government, where bureaucratic competition is more 
pervasive68. Of course there is a kind of ‘government market’ still – marked especially by intense 
ecological competition between agencies for scarce budgets. But budgetary tussles are not 
directly a dynamic for organisational change and innovation – they may spark changes, but are 
mostly too incremental to do so. 
A blunt tool for achieving some evolution 
Seen in this light, a reasonable frequency of Whitehall reorganisations might be justified 
systemically in a different light from the arguments for or against particular individual changes. 
Reorganisations might be seen as fulfilling a useful political corrective to Kaufman’s ‘immortal’ 
government agencies by periodically shaking up otherwise more and more ossified structures69 . 
While government departments rarely go out of business, and can never go bankrupt, they 
can be exposed to being reorganised, to seeing parts of their functions merged into rival 
departments and to seeing their own scope of functions changing character or being radically 
downsized. The threat of reorganisation is thus a constant spur to senior officials and ministers 
to do a good job and to avoid disasters – especially successive disasters which may trigger 
radical de-mergers or even complete absorption into another ministry. Equally the ability to 
expand turf and to take on new functions and extend the scale of department operations may 
sometimes provide a stimulus to their ministers and senior officials to be successful. 
Even if some reorganisations are carried out too frequently, so that some fail or are quickly 
unwound, a fairly constant pulse of politically induced changes might be defended as a useful 
element in constantly energising the Whitehall system. There is a strong line of analysis in 
organisational studies that argues that some degree of strictly random (or ‘stochastic’) change 
can be therapeutic in keeping managers on their toes, creating a degree of uncertainty in an 
otherwise ‘over-determined’ and perhaps permanently static top government sector.70 
Comparing government departments and private corporations 
This kind of organisational analysis has been strengthened by evidence that the tempo 
of reorganisations in comparably large firms to government departments has increased 
considerably in recent decades, especially in industry sectors most affected by the increased 
pace of IT and internet-lead changes, e-commerce processes and the ‘disintermediation’ of 
middle actors in corporate value chains. Where once company structures up to the 1960s 
followed unitary or U-form hierarchical structures, the next two decades saw a transition 
widely to ‘multi-form’ or M-form structures where company budgets and power bases were 
divided.71 From the 1990s onwards the pace of organisational change and diversification of 
strategies has seemed to increase strongly in large private companies. 
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 The growth of matrix management in the private sector 
Many large firms now have some form of ‘matrix management’ set-up and regularly ‘flex’ or 
change their de-layered management structures every two or so years, making the regular 
U-form patterns that Whitehall departments still seek to emulate only a distant memory in 
most of the big corporate sector. Corporate efforts to optimize structures have become ever 
more sophisticated and fine-tuned around efforts to secure stronger performance in terms 
of delivering ‘shareholder value’, securing faster innovation or achieving more organisational 
growth – not by any means necessarily analogous or even easily compatible objectives. 
At the same time, matrix models have flourished because there has been an increasing 
recognition that: ‘There is value in an organisational design that will perform reasonably well in 
a variety of environments, even if it is not perfectly adapted to the current context’.66 Instead 
of the ‘tight coupling’ optimisation strategies that dominated organisational design innovation 
a couple of decades ago, business strategists have realised that fitting only a single set of 
conditions and imperatives can be wasteful. Other organisational forms may be better suited to 
encouraging continuous innovation and spreading its implications through a firm’s operations. 
‘Loose coupling’ approaches instead aim to anticipate a high rate of change in markets, 
technologies and business processes, and to create frameworks for organisational management 
that can change easily, without extensive disruption being an inevitable concomitant of 
managerial or organisational strategy changes. 
Meanwhile, the pace of mergers and acquisitions in the corporate sector has generally remained 
high, despite the mounting evidence that a substantial fraction of larger corporate mergers have 
been unsuccessful and some have had to be unwound after the rapid demise of anticipated 
‘synergies’ – as with the unbundling of the Time-Warner and AOL merger in 2009 after the 
union of content-provider and once-leading internet services provider completely failed to 
generate the benefits that were anticipated when the two companies were brought together at 
the height of the dot.com boom. 
Rewards to targeted, not acquiring, firms 
More generally the consistent message of scientific studies of mergers and acquisitions is 
that they deliver rewards chiefly to the shareholders of targeted firms, while their impacts on 
acquiring firms’ shareholder value is generally either negative or negligible. The chief reason for 
this assymmetry in returns is that acquiring firms’ managements almost always encounter far 
more difficulty in integrating the organisational cultures of the previously separate firms than 
they originally anticipated, or in achieving ‘synergies’ in areas like integrating ICT provision or 
reconciling different service philosophies. 
Figure 34 below also shows that a characteristic after-effect of a merger or acquisition is a 
dip in productivity in the combined business, as management time and attention are diverted 
into achieving structural changes and integration. At the same time productivity typically dips 
because a proportion of the staff most affected by the transition will find the change process 
disruptive for their life plans and work expectations. Some skilled staff may well leave for other 
employers rather than face uncertainties or risks in the transition period. Other workers and 
junior managers will resist changes (either consciously or unconsciously), and morale in the 
newly acquired units, or in existing sections merged with newly acquired units, will typically 
fall until the new organisational trajectory is firmly re-established and greater predictability in 
78  4: A deeper case for MoG changes? 
 operations returns. New owners often run into difficulties even if they opt for strategies such as 
running the newly acquired organisations in separated or multi-firm structures (as with Sony’s 
efforts to run its movie businesses in a different way from its main company operations)72 . 
Figure 34: The productivity dip experienced in most mergers and acquisitions  
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These now very well-documented experiences have many analogies in Whitehall 
reorganisations. As we have seen in the case studies, it is the acquiring departments, whether 
brand new or the larger merger partner, which face the greatest reorganisation challenges. 
Demerged departments, having lost a portion of their business, can more rapidly refocus on 
their narrower remit and face no real cultural or morale problems (e.g. DCSF). Interestingly, the 
evolution of department reconfigurations in the UK towards more matrix-like structures like the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families may indicate that the public sector is attempting 
to replicate the more flexible and agile private sector experiences. However positive this 
development may be, our research indicates that Whitehall has a long way to go before seeing 
the benefits of these changes. 
Looking back across all the issues considered in this chapter, we see that rearranging and 
merging departments is a blunt tool which at times successfully induces fundamental changes 
and much-needed improvements that re-energise Whitehall where ‘immortal’ departments 
might otherwise risk becoming ossified. Whether or not reconfiguring departments is the  
best way to achieve these changes is debatable. A recent Institute for Government study, 
Shaping Up, identifies a number of tools which could help solve policy and administrative 
coordination challenges including: 
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 •	� cross-cutting programmes with associated budgets and cross-departmental boards; 
•	� cross-cutting remits for particular client groups and control of discretionary spending; 
•	� shared units providing analytical capacity and advice to departments on particular cross-
cutting issues.73 
Whether or not the use of these tools reduces the frequency of department reconfigurations 
in the future, we can expect at least some machinery of government changes to continue. The 
focus of our next chapter, then, ison recommending ways to smooth the one consistent thorn 
in all mergers and demergers: lack of planning and limited attention to sound management 
principles. 
For a discussion of how New Public Management legacies, ICT systems and agencification affects 
the ability of government to embrace matrix management and smoother reconfigurations in 
Whitehall, see Annex 4. 
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 Recommendations
�
“... these big complex organisational changes, because they are often 
politically motivated, are forced through the system at a wholly 
inappropriate rate preventing good planning. Which is not to say they can 
never be the right thing to do but you would certainly have far fewer when 
you only did them for non-political reasons – and you would certainly take a 
lot more time to plan them.” (Former advisor, No. 10). 
It is one thing to analyse what’s wrong with an existing business process in a complex 
administrative/political system like British central government, but quite another thing to find 
ways of improving these arrangements for the future. Reorganising Whitehall departments, or 
machinery of government changes in official parlance, are a reasonably effective way for Prime 
Ministers to indicate changing political priorities to their Cabinet colleagues, the Whitehall 
machine and to voters. It is also very unlikely that reorganisations can simply be wished away in 
favour of a permanently relevant pattern of programmatic ministries, as Ted Heath apparently 
wished to do in the early 1970s. Nor should we put much stock in the claims of opposition 
parties that they would reorganise less, however sincere and well-intentioned these statements 
may be at the time that they are issued. And, as Chapter 4 showed, there are good reasons for 
some periodic shake-ups of long-lived bureaucracies, and some reasons why in the modern era 
we might wish to create more agility and flexibility in British government structures. 
Changes are costly 
The chief problem with Whitehall reorganisations is that they are sometimes (but not 
invariably) costly to undertake, and that under current arrangements they are often rushed and 
ill-planned affairs. 
One barrier here is that traditionally the Treasury’s approach to reorganisations has been 
that they must be cost-neutral and that no new resources can be made available, even in 
the first year of a brand new department, to help smooth the changes being undertaken. 
This approach is widely seen by our interviewees as being especially unrealistic for new 
departments especially, and for major reorganisations of existing functions. The Treasury stance 
has no counterpart in the private sector and it is dysfunctional, forcing new departments to 
obsess about finding relatively small amounts of money (say £15m for the first year of a new 
departmental centre, which is trivial in terms of overall central government running costs) to 
simply conduct their basic operations. 
A first area to examine concerns ways of reducing the costs of making MoG changes for the 
delivery of public services and the efficient operation of government business. Most of our panel 
of senior officials involved in recent reorganisations accept that there is no simple constitutional 
way in which Prime Ministers’ use of departmental reorganisations can be constrained or 
reduced, but even within this mindset they identified some critical areas where improvements 
could be made in making reorganisations easier to accomplish, shown in Figure 35. 
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 Need for support from the centre 
Far and away the most common demand from the civil service is for stronger levels of support 
from the Cabinet Office and the Treasury (the central departments) for teams involved in major 
reorganisations and especially in new department creations. Time and again our interviewees 
accounts of major changes were littered with laments that teams setting up new or greatly 
reorganised departments had to struggle on their own with procedural, legal, financial and 
administrative issues where they might reasonably have expected that the central departments 
would already have key information and a rich stock of past experience on which to draw. 
Figure 35: Ways of easing Whitehall department changes 
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7 
Results based on codication of interviews with 18 senior civil servants involved in department level machinery of government changes 
between 1979-2009. 
As one former senior civil servant put it: 
The Cabinet Office is not sufficiently institutionally equipped to make these 
changes when they have to happen. [Person X] used to have responsibility 
for MoG changes but most of [the] focus, and [Person X] readily admits 
[this], is on the Whitehall bureaucracy – like sorting the budgets out and all 
that stuff. And it always surprises me how difficult that is. But there are all 
sorts of organisational developmental dimensions to this, which any well-
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 versed practitioner of mergers and acquisitions in the private sector could 
talk to you about, which Whitehall has no institutional knowledge of. And 
frankly, for as long as we continue to have MoG changes happening as often 
as they are, the more important it is that when they do happen, we are well-
equipped to know what goes wrong and what you can do to avoid it.74 
There was a prevailing commentary on the relative ‘amateurism’ of the Cabinet Office in 
handling MoG changes, its lack of a cumulative knowledge base, and the consequent need for 
reorganisation teams in departments to scrabble around with their own resources to find out 
how things were done last time or in analogous past reorganisations: 
The people who do MoG [machinery of government] work are people who 
work in the Secretariats, whose main job is something else – and [they] are 
not particularly experts in what makes good organisations tick. And we 
did try..., to have some capacity to think in that way. Not necessarily by 
employing someone but at least trying to work out where we could go to get 
it. But [the Cabinet Office] didn’t think it was necessary.75 
There is some evidence that the Cabinet Office has begun to pay closer attention to Whitehall 
reorganisations and is attempting to provide more support. Most recently it has published 
for the first time some guidelines to follow during a departmental change (although with 
somewhat unrealistic timelines and assumptions).76 But there are still no substantive resources 
available to new departments and the relevant sections of the Cabinet Office continue to lack 
capacity, authority, and budget to help smooth changes, thus severely limiting the positive role 
that they could potentially play. 
One of the most acute problems for brand new departments is that they come into existence 
with nothing, and the Cabinet Office provides them with no temporary extra support. Thus the 
new team must put together a whole apparatus of support for ministers such as private offices, 
a media office and linkages to the policy and administrative sections of the new department, 
at the same time as trying to design and plan their own structures, negotiate budgets, secure 
personnel and deal with the ‘donor’ departments who are giving up functions to them. 
Thus new departments are working in overdrive from the word go just to keep their heads 
above water in providing services to ministers, Parliament, the media and stakeholders, while 
simultaneously designing the new organisational architecture and looking for the resources and 
permanent personnel to run the new structures with. This is a near-impossible load and is not 
conducive to any kind of well-planned organisational transition. 
Yet why does this huge load fall upon the new team at all? The British civil service is still one of 
the most integrated and consistently operated public service systems in the western world. So 
it seems unclear why the Cabinet Office cannot organise a ‘scratch’ transition team that could 
lend personnel from other departments to the new arrival for a period of (say) six weeks or so, 
to provide a working press and communications operation and temporary private offices for the 
new ministers, while most of the core transition team of senior officials are thereby liberated to 
accomplish essential transition planning. 
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 Divergent areas need to be identified and understood in advance 
Senior officials believe that differential pay rates across Whitehall departments are the second 
most important area where changes are needed to lower the costs of reorganisation (see Figure 
33 above). Our case studies in Chapter 3 also demonstrated that in several cases accommodating 
units brought together in reorganisations that had divergent levels of pay created industrial 
relations issues and necessitated costly adjustments before organisational cultural differences 
could begin to be addressed by moving personnel more flexibly across the department. 
There is some evidence that the Economic and Domestic Affairs Secretariat within the Cabinet 
Office has recently paid closer attention to the potential costs and challenges of organisational 
change as a result of these legacy problems.77 But at present their role appears to be no more 
than warning in vague terms of potential problems, rather than being able to offer professional 
advice on how to properly manage the challenges of handling differential pay problems. Some 
of our respondents argued for a return to the older system where the central departments 
were responsible for managing collective bargaining arrangements for Whitehall departments 
as a pay group overall. One interviewee recalled: “Things like the big department [X] was set 
up and pulled apart again – it was not so time consuming or impractical to do. People had the 
same pay arrangements. All these pragmatic issues have got more and more difficult.”78 At the 
very least, the Treasury and Cabinet Office should ensure that divergences between related 
(or sufficiently similar to be potentially related) areas do not diverge so markedly as to make 
reorganisations infeasible. 
IT is always an additional costly project 
IT challenges are an often cited influence in raising the costs of reorganisations, creating 
transition difficulties and delays in getting reorganised divisions to pull together effectively. 
Whitehall has a poor track record of IT management, especially under the current system which 
is largely fragmented.79 The appointment of a government Chief Information Officer (without 
much of a budget, but with a brief to head up the ICT profession in the civil service as a whole), 
the development of the Council of Chief Information Officers as a forum for professional and 
coordinative development, and some new central facilities in training government IT managers 
have made a start in rowing back the excessive fragmentation of IT during the ‘new public 
management’ period. Yet the Cabinet Office and Treasury competence in these areas remains 
very weak, despite their central importance in a period of ‘digital-era governance’. A recent 
Institute for Government study argued that the Treasury needs to rebuild some of its past 
capacity to monitor, and to some degree direct, department’s ICT programmes.80 One of the 
key objectives here might well be to ensure that reorganisations of medium and small-sized 
departments could be accomplished more easily in future, with more flexible and easily  
re-configurable ICT architectures than those of the recent past. 
Better planning 
Despite the strong criticisms that our former senior officials made of the secretive, sudden and 
often completely ‘out of the blue’ character of departmental reorganisations, better planning of 
MoG changes only featured fourth in their suggestions for making improvements. Many senior 
officials we spoke with are deeply pessimistic that any changes could be made to the current 
politically expedient system with its impromptu, uncosted and largely unanalysed prime- 
ministerial decisions. Yet there is an important argument that Prime Ministers and Cabinet 
Secretaries should engage in much more planning. 
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 Although there is some potential for embarrassment under current conventions if news of 
reorganisations leaks out, we could not identify in any of our discussions exactly why so 
many Whitehall reconfigurations have been so rushed and poorly executed. The operational 
challenges which ensue add greatly to costs especially with new department creations. The 
lack of planning also contributes to reorganisations having potentially higher rates of failure in 
the long-term. 
Changing announcement conventions 
Some of our interviewees argued forcefully that many of the currently encountered problems 
could be avoided by simply changing conventions to announce changes ahead of time by at 
least three or four weeks, and further in advance for complex or large-scale reorganisations.  
As one said: 
The right thing would be to produce the blueprint but promise that it 
won’t happen until after the next election or [Cabinet] reshuffle, so that the 
politicians did not feel it would affect them personally.81 
Shifting to a pattern where the Prime Minister announces changes in department structures 
well in advance of the new arrangements becoming live can work well, as the Department of 
Work and Pensions case study shows. There is no necessary reason why this approach should 
create any political embarrassment for incumbent ministers, nor would it in any way contribute 
to secretaries of state being seen as ‘lame ducks’ or attracting more opposition criticism. 
A more grown-up attitude to Whitehall changes by the government would contribute instead 
to more mature and considered approaches by opposition parties and the media. This shift 
of convention would also create new pre-change opportunities for Parliament to be involved 
in helping to debate and potentially help shape reorganisations, especially via the relevant 
departmental select committees. A limited degree of pre-announcement would also create new 
opportunities for additional government accountability in planning and explaining the rationale 
for changes, without inhibiting the Prime Minister’s freedom of action or ability to respond to 
new political imperatives and circumstances. 
Post-change accountability 
Merely adjusting announcement conventions is unlikely to be enough, however. Another 
change that seems desirable is to improve the post-reorganisation accountability of the 
government to Parliament for changes made in Whitehall structures. The current very weak 
‘negative resolution’ procedure needs to be replaced by a properly informed assessment of the 
reorganisation process made at a relevant time period, such as six months after the changes are 
implemented. To help avoid a partisan colouration of such consideration, a report to Parliament 
as a whole might be best prepared by the relevant House of Commons departmental select 
committee, and officials from the National Audit Office (NAO) might be seconded to the 
Committee to help ensure that the reorganisation planning and the scale of any remaining 
integration problems or achievements already made are more objectively assessed. 
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 To help sum up these considerations, we offer these recommendations: 
1. Departmental reorganisations should be unlinked from the immediate context of 
ministerial reshuffle announcements. Departments should not be created until 
at least four weeks after they are announced, giving time for initial preparation 
and set-up. Any large-scale changes should not be implemented until after an 
affirmative parliamentary resolution (point 2 below). The current conventions of 
maintaining extreme secrecy about prospective changes of department structures 
should be abandoned. 
2. All departmental reconfigurations should require an affirmative parliamentary 
resolution when transfer of functions orders are laid and before substantial 
reorganisation work begins. Parliament should have an opportunity to consider 
departmental changes in a detailed way before a vote is held, possibly in the 
Liaison Committee of Select Committee chairs in the House of Commons, or 
possibly in a joint meeting of relevant departmental select committees. The 
Cabinet Secretary and permanent secretaries involved should attend to outline 
how it is intended that planned reorganisations will work. A detailed cost-benefit 
analysis of the changes made and a properly developed business plan should 
be considered in advance of the main parliamentary debate by the relevant 
departmental select committee, assisted by staff from the National Audit 
Office. The Treasury must be more realistic in recognising that new and heavily 
reorganised departments will necessarily incur extra costs for at least their first 
year and that this needs to be factored into reorganisation planning. 
3. The Cabinet Office and Treasury need to improve their procedures and capabilities 
to provide more positive support for new or heavily reorganised departments. The 
Cabinet Office should create a capacity to provide a ‘scratch team’ to run a new 
department’s core responsiveness operations for a transition period of at least 
six weeks, helping set-up press operations, interim human resources functions 
and facilitating IT and finance systems changes, while its senior officials are 
undertaking the reorganisation work. The Cabinet Office should recognise that 
the reorganisation of departments is a vital task that is likely to recur reasonably 
frequently, and should henceforth be properly documented and continuously 
improved over time – instead of the current situation where experience resets to 
zero in each new case. 
4. The cost-benefit analysis, business plan and strategic change programme 
originally submitted to Parliament should provide a focus for the relevant 
departmental select committee to assess the benefits and costs of changes, 
assisted by staff from the National Audit Office, within 18 months to two years. 
By this time changes should have ‘bedded in’ and differential pay or productivity 
dip problems should be evident.  
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Annex
�
 1. How we researched this report
�
The core research for this report consists of 34 structured interviews with senior civil servants, 
politicians, private sector experts and leading academics. The majority of our interviews were 
conducted with senior civil servants who occupied the post of Permanent Secretary between 
1979 and 2009 and many interviewees have experienced several machinery of government 
changes directly and indirectly in their careers. As such, many participants have contributed 
comments to more than one section of the report. 
We also had the great fortune of consulting with former and current professionals in the 
Privy Council Office and the Machinery of Government Secretariat in Canada as well as the 
Machinery of Government contact at the Australian Public Service Commission. Private sector 
experts were consulted on organisational change management and merger and acquisition best 
practices. Lastly, academics in both business administration and public policy studies in the UK 
at the London School of Economics and the London Business School, as well as in Australia at 
Griffith University and Melbourne University have provided helpful advice at various points 
throughout the course of the study. 
We conducted extensive literature and evidence reviews for each section, and collated and 
analysed a range of departmental and international performance data where appropriate to do so. 
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anada 


Typical approval process of large-scale departmental change in Canada 
Consultation 
Prime Minister proposes 
changes internally 
Privy Council Office (PCO) 
Machinery of Government 
Secretariat Advises 
Advise PM on proposed MoG changes 
via consultation with Government 
entities. 
Establish: costs, disruption, 
implementation time, accountability, 
service targets, alternatives where 
applicable, impact on size or operation 
of government, ongoing relevance. 
Preparation time: Variable 
From a few days to several weeks
The degree of consultation in 
advance of the announcement of 
change varies as a result of the 
political sensitivity of the change. 
Announcement and 
approval 
PM announces change 
followed by Order in Council 
Government tables legislation 
to confirm change 
Parliament confirms change 
Legislation confirms the following 
details: 
Responsible Minister 
Ministerial powers, duties and 
functions 
Activities of the organisation and 
other appropriate information 
Preparation time: Variable
Overall: Months to years
Initial change: 3­5 days 
Whilst the change is operationally 
functional via PM prerogative power 
and once an Order in Council is laid, 
significant operational changes may 
be delayed until the change is 
confirmed in statute. 
 
Implementation 
Department operationally 
existent once announced 
Significant organisational 
changes require statute 
Treasury Board Secretariat 
(TBS) supports change 
Support given on HR integration, 
labour disputes, pay harmonisation, 
business plan development, IT changes, 
strategic review of priorities in change 
period. 
Budget given for pay harmonisation, 
and when required for significant IT 
challenges. 
Preparation time: Variable 
TBS Support ongoing. 
Whilst the change is operationally 
functional via PM prerogative power 
and once an Order in Council is laid, 
significant operational changes may 
be delayed until the change is 
confirmed in statute. 
Assessment via TBS 
TBS scrutinises operational 
performance and plans 
TBS recommends programme 
changes for Budget annually 
Budget approved by 
Parliament 
Budget spend priorities are set out 
using the previous  year’s performance 
and future business plans as indicators 
of success. 
Unsuccessful MoG changes may lose 
programme budget. 
Preparation time: Ongoing
TBS Support immediate
TBS assessment begins in the 
implementation phase with support 
programs. Financial ramifications of 
poor  performance can occur if 
business plans need to be changed 
throughout the year or annually 
during the Budget process. 
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Change process compiled based on Canadian government websites and interviews with Canadian officials. 
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Typical approval process of large-scale departmental change in Australia 
90  3. The change process in A
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Consultation 
Prime Minister proposes 
changes internally 
Department of Prime Minister 
& Cabinet (PM&C) 
Secretary of PM&C advises 
Advise PM on proposed MoG changes 
via consultation with Government 
entities and the Department for Finance 
and Deregulation. 
PM briefed on costs, disruption, 
service targets, etc as required by PM 
and as time permits. 
Preparation Time:  Variable 
From a few days to several weeks 
The degree of consultation in 
advance of the announcement of 
change varies as a result of the 
political sensitivity of the change. 
Announcement and 
approval 
PM announces change 
Departments seek advice from 
PM&C 
Administrative Arrangements 
Order (AAO) 
AAO contains an entry for each 
department of state which describes 
the principal matters dealt with by that 
department and then lists all of the 
legislation administered by the Minister 
responsible for that department and 
other agencies in the Minister’s 
portfolio. 
Preparation Time: Variable 
Initial change: 3­5 days 
New Ministerial arrangements take 
effect on the day that the new 
Ministry is sworn in. 
Similarly, any changes to the AAO 
take effect on the day that the AAO 
is made. 
Implementation 
Department Finance and 
Deregulation support 
Transfer of appropriations, 
superannuation issues, accounting, 
reporting, banking, legal and 
governance issues. 
Australian Public Service 
Commission support 
Movement of staff 
Department Employment and 
Workplace  Relations support 
Remuneration, terms and conditions of 
employment and work place 
arrangements. 
Time: Variable: Months 
The level of support by the above 
entities is largely advisory in nature 
although transparency is encouraged 
including the identification of 
resource implications. No budget is 
available. 
Assessment via 
Budget process 
Department of Finance and 
Deregulation  develop plans 
Senate Committee scrutinises 
portfolio budget submissions 
Budget approved by 
Parliament 
Budget spend priorities are set out 
using the previous  year’s performance 
and future business plans as indicators 
of success. 
Unsuccessful MoG changes may lose 
programme budget. 
Time: Ongoing 
Departments which need to change 
outcome targets in advance of 
budget because of resource 
implications of MoG changes may 
do so by consultation with 
Department of Finance and 
Deregulation. 
Change process compiled based on Australia website research. 
  
4. The effects of NPM, ICT and 
agencification on the agility of Whitehall 
Could the existing capacity for accomplishing departmental changes be improved further 
in the near future? One area where more might have been expected concerns the impact 
of ‘agencification’, the series of changes carried out in the period from 1988 to 1996 which 
eventually involved moving 55% of the then civil service personnel out of being directly 
employed in Whitehall ministries and into the so-called ‘Next Steps’ executive agencies. 
Along with other forms of ‘arm’s length administration’ such as non-departmental public 
bodies (NDPBs), quasi-governmental agencies (QGAs) and quasi-non-governmental agencies 
(quangos), the executive agencies have their own management structures, budgets, staffing 
systems, IT systems and planning processes. So moving these substantial chunks of personnel 
and operations out of departments should have meant that the consequences of departmental 
reorganisations were reduced to just the Whitehall headquarters staff level. Agencies 
should be able to move from one department to another without this having very strong 
or major implications for how they were named, managed or run. So one might expect that 
agencification would have radically reduced the transactions costs of departmental changes. 
There may indeed have been some gains here, but in the current state of knowledge they 
cannot be very clearly or accurately identified, and nor have these gains been as large as might 
have been hoped, for several reasons. First, although the centre of government is now smaller, 
there has been something of a ‘rowing back’ since the noughties from the level of operational 
independence originally anticipated for agencies. In November 2009 the Chief Secretary of 
the Treasury estimated at an IfG seminar that there were 750 separate agency and other 
bodies across central government, of which somewhat less than 300 can be thought of as 
administratively substantial bodies. Giving all such bodies operational freedom as originally 
envisaged by the Next Steps enthusiasts would entail an unacceptable duplication of IT, finance, 
accounting and HR and personnel services across central government. Instead the push for 
‘shared services’ is for departments to pool more and more of these services so as to cut back-
office costs and improve efficiency. The same pressures have meant that departments are once 
again providing more services for agencies in their departmental group as a whole, and there is 
pressure to go further in this respect. In addition there have been strong political and control 
reasons why the practical independence of agencies and NDPBs have tended to be curtailed in 
recent years compared with the heyday of the ‘new public management’ (NPM) period. Indeed 
service delivery disasters by agencies, quangos and contractors have all played important 
parts in some recent departmental reorganisations, such as the Ministry of Justice take-over 
of prisons or the short-lived career of the Department for Innovation, University and Skills. 
These incidents have served to emphasise that the Whitehall headquarters bodies involved 
were showing a failing grip on the bodies in their departmental group – and strengthened 
pressures from ministers and via the Whitehall ‘capability reviews’ for top officials to keep a 
very close watch and involvement with the bodies for which they are answerable. Although 
all governments promise a cull of ‘quangos’ and agencies early in their terms of office, only to 
then create new bodies themselves within a short period, the looming fiscal crunch for the UK 
state from 2010 to around 2015 is likely to also intensify recentralisation pressures and the rise 
of a far more integrated style of ‘digital era governance’ in which facilities across departmental 
groups are increasingly pooled. The clear implication here is that the costs of departmental 
reorganisations may once again increase steeply as these new structures dismantle the older 
NPM legacy arrangements. 
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 Another NPM legacy has also made departmental reorganisations more expensive, namely 
the creation from the 1990s onwards of more and more localised and differentiated pay 
settlements across Whitehall. With nationwide and cross-departmental pay negotiations 
increasingly replaced by more departmental-specific and regionalised or even localised deals, 
civil service pay levels across different Whitehall bodies have significantly diverged. Where 
departmental mergers then bring back together sections with disparate levels of pay then 
an additional cost of transition is created as the merged department tries to re-equalise the 
levels of pay involved – without which staff cannot be easily redeployed from one section of 
the ministry to another. Since pay cuts are never politically or legally feasible, this means that 
either extra resources have to be found to bring the low paid divisions up to the department 
average, or the higher paid divisions have to be held back from pay increases until the lower 
paid sections catch up – with deleterious consequences for organisational morale and the loss 
of key staff to other agencies or career paths. We show in Chapter 3 that pay disparities, and 
the industrial disputes which often surround them, have played significant roles in increasing 
the costs of some recent reorganisations. 
One of the least-well recognised aspects of ‘digital era governance’ is that Whitehall 
departments are now heavily dependent upon their ICT systems to maintain the day-to-
day standard of their operations. Several decades of efficiency drives and greater use of risk 
assessment systems in administration have tended to create systems of administration that are 
highly vulnerable to problems with IT systems. Hence we show in Chapter 3 that a significant 
intermediate to long-term cost of most reorganisations is the need to reorganise IT systems 
– to detach the IT system for a moved division from department A’s systems and to move it 
across to department B’s systems. Of course, this is not an immediate need, especially given 
agencification. Yet having multiple ICT systems working differently in different bits of a merged 
department is a very important barrier to the development of more integrated organisational 
culture and methods of working. 
In the longer term, some developments in how government computing and IT systems are 
organised may hold out some promise of making reorganisations easier to achieve in the future. 
Outside of a few very big siloes – such as the HMRC tax systems, the DWP social security 
systems, and the Ministry of Defence’s personnel and support IT – by 2020 it is possible that 
more and more Whitehall department’s ICT systems will have begun to migrate to a ‘cloud 
computing’ set up. In cloud computing the departments no longer run their own IT systems or 
their own IT contracts with big systems integrator companies. Instead these facilities could be 
run centrally in a ‘government cloud’ where servers are outsourced and shared across multiple 
departments and agencies. If and when such a configuration is achieved, then the costs and 
disruptions involved in moving divisions from one department to another might be substantially 
reduced if both bodies were already using the ‘government cloud’ facilities. 
Similarly, one of the bigger immediately adverse implications of reorganisations for stakeholders 
in the period 1995-2005 was the disruption caused to web traffic by changes in the web 
addresses (the URLs) of the reorganised departments. This problem was substantially reduced 
by the emergence of excellent search engines, especially Google, which is increasingly the 
dominant means by which citizens and stakeholders locate the facilities and sections they need 
within central government. Since 2008 in particular, the centralisation of citizen-facing and 
business-facing government websites in three sites for citizens at www.direct.gov.uk, business at 
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www.businesslink.gov.uk and the NHS at www.nhschoices.nhs.uk is seen by Labour ministers 
and the senior civil service as a further step that in a sense unlinks access to services from 
associations with any particular department’s name. In the near future, it is possible that the 
current planned centralisation will be taken a stage further, with both business and NHS traffic 
being directed via the direct.gov site. However, with the increased use of search engines to 
locate services a 2007 NAO report raises substantial issues about whether changing the names 
of government websites has much impact, and hence whether it makes reorganisation any 
cheaper or easier to accomplish. The costs factors here may not be very substantial.
 5. Acronyms
�
ALB Arms-length bodies 
BERR Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
BIS Department for Business, Innovation And Skills 
BNOC British North Sea Oil Corporation 
BERR Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
DCA Department for Constitutional Affairs 
DCLG Department of Communities and Local Government 
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
DCSF Department for Children, Schools and Families 
DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change 
DEE Department of Education and Employment 
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs 
DET Department of Environment and Transport 
DETR Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
DFAIT Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
DfES Department for Education and Skills 
DFID Department for International Development 
DFT Department for Transport 
DHSS Department of Health & Social Security 
DIUS Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills 
DNH Department of National Heritage 
DoE Department of Energy 
DoH Department of Health 
DRA Department for Rural Affairs 
DSS Department of Social Security 
DTI Department for Industry and Trade 
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 DTLR Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions 
DWP Department for Work and Pensions 
FAC Foreign Affairs Canada 
FCO British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
HMRC HM Revenue & Customs 
IPPR Institute for Public Policy Research 
ITCan International Trade Canada 
JSA Jobseeker’s Allowance 
LSC Learning and Skills Concil 
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
MoD Ministry of Overseas Development 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
MoE Ministry of Education 
MoG Machinery of Government 
MoJ Ministry of Justice 
NAO National Audit Office 
NDPB Non-departmental public bodies 
NOMs National Offender Management Services 
OCC Office of Climate Change 
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PDCS Pensions, Disability and Carer’s Service 
PM Prime Minister 
QGA Quasi-governmental agency 
Quangos Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation 
SOS Secretary of State 
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